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INTRODUCTION
This Article draws on an episode of nineteenth-century American
doctrinal history to develop a pluralist approach to explaining
changes in property law. It addresses the question: What causes ac-
count for the development of property regimes across time? The
courts' answer emerges from examination of nineteenth-century
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Ralf Michaels, Carol Rose, Rich Schragger, Joseph W. Singer, and Jonathan Wiener for
comments on earlier drafts, and to Margaret Roth and the other editors of the Cornell Law
Review for excellent editing. This Article has also benefited from faculty presentations at
Fordham Law School, Duke University School of Law, the University of Virginia Law
School, Boston University Law School, Stanford Law School, and Northwestern University
Law School. All errors and omissions are mine.
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American reform of the law of waste, which governs the changes te-
nants may make in the estates they occupy. A line of state supreme
court cases, beginning in 1810, transformed the doctrine from the
strict rule of English common law to a flexible standard. Economic
analysis helps to explain the change; the full story, however, emerges
only upon consideration of two other influences on waste doctrine:
republican political culture, and the belief that European settlers were
under a natural-law obligation to subdue the American wilderness and
make it a fruitful, agrarian landscape.
A. Economic and Pluralist Approaches to Property Law
By a pluralist account, I mean one denying that a single theory
can provide property regimes either adequate empirical explanation
or normative orientation. From a pluralist perspective, property re-
gimes, like other legal and social institutions, reflect a number of dif-
ferent values. In this view, plural values structure individual lives, the
activity of societies, and even the diversity of human cultures. These
values are not only diverse, but sometimes competing and, past a
point, mutually incompatible. Sometimes, however, they are mutually
reinforcing. Moreover, in a pluralist approach, diverse values may all
be legitimate; they need not reflect error, irrationality, or deviance,
but rather may express the variety of human commitments and aspira-
tions.' The interweaving of the explanatory and normative dimen-
sions of a pluralist account is straightforward. Explanatorily, people
actually do pursue a variety of goods, and so it is possible to under-
stand their behavior only in light of that variety. Normatively, if vari-
1 On pluralism in values generally, see ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, reprinted
in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND I (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 1997); JOHN
GRAY, Two FACES OF LIBERALISM 34-68 (2000); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 495-521 (1989). Value pluralism has at least two lines of
origin in modern thought. One line embodies the skepticism of figures as diverse as
Michel de Montaigne and David Hume, who rejected the medieval Aristotelian view that all
goods are reconcilable in one highest good, and instead posited a world in which human
reason gave us no reason to believe in a unified and universally available account of moral
reasoning. See DAVID HUME, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in ENQUIRIES CON-
CERINING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 169, 169-75
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1975) (1777); MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Apology for Raymond Sebond, in
THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 318, 318-457 (Donald M. Frame trans., Stanford
Univ. Press 1958) (1588); MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Cannibals, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF
MONTAIGNE, supra, at 150, 150-59. The other line embodies the romantic strand of
thought associated with Johann Gottfried von Herder. He proposed that each human cul-
ture creates a unique vocabulary and grammar of cultural expression and of value, which
give sense and meaning to the lives of those who inhabit that culture and which cannot be
judged against any higher or independent standard. SeeJOHANN GoTTFRIED VON HERDER,
How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People (1765), re-
printed in PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 3, 3-39 (Michael N. Forster ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2002).
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ous goods are legitimate, then only a normative account that
recognizes the variety of legitimate goods can be sufficient.2
Although economic accounts of property regimes are present in
Aristotle,' Locke,4 and Blackstone, 5 the canonical account in contem-
porary legal scholarship is Harold Demsetz's Toward a Theory of Property
Rights.6 Demsetz proposes that property rights emerged and changed
in response to the rational desire of economic actors to engage in self-
interest-maximizing transactions. 7 He further proposes that property
rights generally operate to internalize externalities by assigning rights
to resources-which means that users of property absorb the benefits
and costs of their uses, and parties bargaining over those resources
take into account the same (anticipated) benefits and costs-so that
both use and allocation tend toward optimality.8 On this premise,
people will demand property rights when the benefit of the potential
internalization created by the right exceeds the cost of the transac-
tion-that is, when they will in fact be able to reap the benefit that the
right makes possible. 9 The creation or reform of property regimes is
typically a response to events that change either the cost of transac-
tions (including monitoring and other enforcement costs) or the ben-
2 From a metaethical perspective, it is important to recognize that pluralism is in
trouble if it implies surrender of all distinctions of value and an unbounded embrace of
whatever people do. Pluralism, if it is not to be pure relativism, must distinguish between
those values over which there is legitimate disagreement and those values outside the pale
of legitimate disagreement, such as a political culture's aspiration to genocide or slavery.
Of course, any such boundary depends on some substantive values, such as equality and
dignity, which then necessarily inform all the values brought within the legitimate plurality.
Over these underlying values, then, it would seem that there can be no legitimate disagree-
ment. How, if at all, are these nonnegotiable values to be justified or explained?
Happily, a pluralist interpretation of legal history need not address this question. For
the pluralist account to be accurate, it does not necessarily have to solve all major problems
of moral reasoning. The claim of my pluralist method is simply that there is a diversity of
legitimate human goods that structure social activity, including the creation and reform of
property regimes. "Accounting for" or "justifying" that plurality is not an obligation that
this historical method assumes.
3 See ARISTOTLE, POLrIICS 44 (Ernest Barker ed., Clarendon Press 1946).
4 SeeJOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT 285, 314-16 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
5 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4-10.
6 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PRAC.)
347 (1967).
7 See id. at 350.
8 See id.
9 As many commentators have noted, Demsetz gave no account of the governance
structure that would translate individual desires for property rights into explicit, enforcea-
ble rights. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Densetz Thesis and the Evolution of
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S333 (2002). His account is thus often associated
with the pure form of a "bottom-up" theory of the origin of property rights, in which de-
mand creates its own supply. See id. at S338. Because this Article concerns the develop-
ment of a regime that was already in existence, rather than the inception of the regime, I
do not address the bottom-up/top-down debate.
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efit to be derived from those transactions, such as changes in
technology or in the availability or price structures of exogenous
markets.10
Building on Demsetz's article, property scholars have devoted
considerable energy to exploring the transition from one rights re-
gime to another. Some have focused their attention on the eco-
nomic efficiency considerations that, on Demsetz's theory, spur the
creation of property rights in response to exogenous shocks in prices,
relative factor values, or technology.1 2
Others, however, have looked not just to efficiency, but also to
problems of collective action, and have concentrated on the mecha-
nisms by which efficiency-driven desire for property rights may be
translated into actual change in property regimes. Scholars con-
cerned with collective-action issues in property regimes have generally
concentrated on one of two typical scenarios for the reform of prop-
erty rights. On the one hand, some explore the development of new
norms among repeat players in close-knit groups.' 3 This scenario
tends to suppose that apprehension of net efficiency gains spurs the
consensual development of new property rights, so that changes will
consistently enhance efficiency.' 4 On the other hand, some scholars
place more emphasis on the seizure of rights-creating political oppor-
tunities by interest groups that stand to benefit from new regimes.1 5
This second scenario encompasses cases in which benefits to the
group that initiates reform of property rights will come at a net cost to
efficiency.' 6 This approach casts a less Panglossian lens across the ret-
rospect of institutional history; it can account for considerable devia-
10 See Demsetz, supra note 6, at 350.
11 See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359
(2002); David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, 31J. LEGAL
STUD. S545 (2002); Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L.
Rav. 181, 182-89 (2003) [hereinafter Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path]; Saul Levmore, Two
Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 (2002) [hereinafter
Levmore, Two Stories]; Gary D. Libecap &James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum
Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589 (2002); Merrill, supra note 9;
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instru-
ment Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999) (applying these concerns to new issues
of resource governance); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolu-
tion of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 117 (2005).
12 See Haddock & Kiesling, supra note 11; Libecap & Smith, supra note 11; Dean
Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S609
(2002).
13 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1335-62 (1993); Had-
dock & Kiesling, supra note 11; Smith, supra note 11, at S478-83.
14 See Ellickson, supra note 13, at 1397-98.
15 See Banner, supra note 11, at S360; Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path, supra note 11, at
183-84.
16 See Banner, supra note 11, at S360-61.
656 [Vol. 91:653
A PLURALIST INTERPRETATION
tions from the supposition that changes in property regimes will
consistently enhance efficiency, rather than represent opportunistic
behavior. 17
These approaches differ in their assessment of the relationship
between individual self-interest and social optimality. The first ap-
proach, in keeping with Demsetz's original model, assumes that op-
timality follows from coordination among self-interested individuals,
while the second accepts that self-interest may lead to successful rent-
seeking and inefficient arrangements that benefit powerful groups.' 8
The two approaches, however, both hold that (1) a model of human
behavior as self-interested is a complete, or at least sufficient, basis for
explanation; and (2) the pursuit of wealth is an adequate proxy for
self-interest generally. 19 It is with respect to the second assumption
that a pluralist approach to property differs from both versions of the
economic explanation.
The pluralist approach need not engage the first assumption:
that people behave in pursuit of their self-interest. That is a question
more of definition than of substance. Any behavior can be described
as self-interested, once self-interest is taken to include the satisfaction
of preferences as various as fulfilling addictive cravings, regarding
oneself as a good or virtuous person, being esteemed a good or virtu-
ous person by others, or expecting salvation in the afterlife.
The second assumption is best engaged on a somewhat higher
level of abstraction than the choice of wealth as a proxy for self-inter-
est. One may put the problem this way: whether any one metric, such
as wealth-maximization, will serve across time, place, and persons as
an adequate stand-in for self-interest generally. In a pluralist ap-
proach, the variety of goods with which people identify their self-inter-
est is too diverse for a single such proxy to capture without significant
distortion.20 Because (1) people care about the well-being of others,
social status, their spiritual standing according to their religious sys-
tems, and a variety of relatively idiosyncratic goods, and have second-
order preferences, or commitments, such as the commitment to not
17 See id.; Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path, supra note 11, at 183-84.
18 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
19 See id.
20 For examples of pluralist approaches to explaining property regimes, see GREGORY
S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIET. COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LE-
GAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997); MARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996);
CAROL M. ROSE, Ancient Constitution Versus Federalist Empire: Antifederalism from the Attack on
"Monarchism" to Modern Localism, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THE-
ORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 71 (1994) [hereinafter PROPERTY AND PERSUASION];
CAROL M. ROSE, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist
Theory, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra, at 25; CAROL M. ROSE, "Takings" and the Practices
of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as "Propriety," in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra, at
49.
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being addicted to chemicals; and (2) the substance of such considera-
tions varies from time to time and place to place, it is often difficult to
account for behavior without a qualitative description of the goods
people desire and the reasons they believe they have for desiring
those goods.2' To explain developments in property systems, it will
sometimes be necessary to attend in some detail to the values people
believe themselves to be pursuing and the reasons they believe they
have to pursue those values. If we do otherwise, we will lack a basic
desideratum of explanation: understanding why people sought and
achieved the developments in property law that they did.22
B. The Law of Waste
The doctrine I consider in this Article is a relatively minor one in
the development of American property law: the law of waste. Waste
law comprises a set of default rules governing the changes a tenant,
for term or for life, may make to the estate she occupies. A tenant
who uses the estate in prohibited ways is said to have "committed
waste" in violation of the rights of the reversioner or remainderman, 23
to whom the estate will pass in fee simple when the tenant's claim
expires. The crux of the law is therefore the definition of waste--that
is, the set of actions a tenant may not commit-and conversely, the set
21 See AMARTYA SEN, Introduction: Rationality and Freedom, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM
3, 4-7 (2002) [hereinafter SEN, Introduction]; AMAR-TYA SEN, Environmental Evaluation and
Social Choice, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra, at 531, 538 [hereinafter SEN, Environmen-
talEvaluation] ("[I]t is hard to judge what choices are or are not 'consistent' or 'irrational,'
without going in some detail into the way the choosers see the problem and what they
think they are trying to achieve.").
22 It is worth noting that the conception of explanation that I employ here owes
something to the work of Charles Taylor, who has stressed that in explaining human be-
havior, it may be important to give an account of the motives of the actors involved in the
situation described that would be, at least potentially, intelligible to them. See TAYLOR,
supra note 1, at 53-90; see also Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the Histoy of
Ideas, in MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND His CRITIcs 29, 56-67 (James Tully
ed., 1988) (exploring how one must have an appreciation for a variety of values to under-
stand the meaning of a work of art). It is, of course, possible to offer an account of social
explanation that proceeds entirely in terms of testing prediction through the formulation
of falsifiable hypotheses. While I would wish to take nothing away from this model, which
needs only to claim that behavior can be predicted if predictions are modeled "as if" peo-
ple were motivated in the way posited by the theory, I accept the view of Taylor, Skinner,
and others that because human action is taken in the context of qualitative values, a full
account of it requires interpretive engagement with those values. On this distinction, see
SEN, Introduction, supra note 21, at 19-33 (contrasting "externalist" approaches with those
that take the agent's experience of value seriously).
23 I will use the terms "reversioner" and "remainderman" synonymously in this Arti-
cle, as the technical difference between these terms has no bearing on the Article's argu-
ment. The person occupying this position is typically a member of either of two classes: a
landlord from whom the tenant rents, or an heir whose inheritance vests fully only at the
end of a life term in the tenant.
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of actions she may commit without express permission from the
reversioner.
In the United States, it is generally said that a tenant may "make
changes in the physical condition of the . . .property which are rea-
sonably necessary in order for the tenant to use the . . property in a
manner that is reasonable under all the circumstances. ' 24 The touch-
stone of this reasonableness standard is the type of use contemplated
in the creation of the tenancy-changes such as harvesting timber,
erecting new buildings, and extracting minerals are permissible to the
extent they are reasonably necessary to conduct the activities that the
parties understand that the tenant may undertake. 25
Such a rule is a good example of what Alan Schwartz has called a
gap-filling or problem-solving default.26 This type of rule seeks to
complete the terms of an insufficiently explicit contract, while preserv-
ing the intent of the contractors. 27 To the extent that the contracting
parties contemplate a particular use of the estate by the tenant, waste
law assumes that they implicitly contemplate all the ordinary incidents
of that use.28 Assuming rational contractors, a gap-filling rule also
promotes efficiency by assigning to each contractor rights which the
parties to a bargained-over arrangement are assumed to have had in
mind in reaching their price; thus, the rule should internalize the
benefits and detriments of the rights exchanged in the bargain. 29
From an economic perspective, waste law addresses the problem
of inefficient incentives faced by tenants for years or life. An efficient
management strategy for an estate will maximize the present dis-
counted value of its entire expected earnings stream. 30 The tenant,
however, will have an incentive to maximize the value of earnings
from the estate during her tenancy.31 This incentive will lead her to
premature harvesting of renewable resources, such as timber, and
nonrenewable resources, such as minerals, and to neglect of resources
whose incremental decay does not affect her earnings prospects but
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORDS & TENANTS § 12.2(1) (1977). I have
omitted "leased" twice from the Restatement's characterization, simply to avoid confusion,
because I am discussing both leased property and life estates, which were far more wide-
spread in the nineteenth century than they are today and thus contributed importantly to
the formation of waste doctrine.
25 See id. § 12.2(1) cmt. c.
26 See Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISc. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1993); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of
Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 389, 390 (1993).
27 See Ayres, supra note 26, at 5; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 390.
28 See discussion infra Part II.A.
29 See Ayres, supra note 26, at 5; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 390.
30 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 3.11, at 71-74 (6th ed. 2003)
(discussing different methods for creating an efficient management strategy for divided-
ownership estates).
31 See id. at 73.
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will affect the long-term value of the estate, such as soil, fences, and
buildings.32 Richard Posner has suggested that an efficient solution to
this problem would be to model the tenant as if she were the owner,
authorizing her to do only what a rational owner would have incentive
to do, not any more or less. 3 3
Indeed, this was the solution reached by the American law of
waste in the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century. The
doctrine had two formulations, which state supreme courts repeated
across the country: first, the standard of husbandry, or of the prudent
farmer, which held a tenant's action not to be waste if it were consis-
tent with the actions a prudent owner would take;34 and second, the
standard of material injury, which held that a material or "permanent
injury to the inheritance," that is, to the reversioner's legitimate inter-
ests, would count as waste. 35 Either the two formulations were treated
as synonymous, or the standard of husbandry was presented as consti-
tuting the inquiry following from the general principle set by the stan-
dard of material injury.36 In either case, the relationship between the
two was the one Posner deems appropriate: judging the tenant by the
standard of a rational owner to ensure that she passes to the rever-
sioner an estate managed in a way consistent with its efficient
exploitation. 37
To the extent that scholars and commentators pay attention to
the law of waste, Posner's efficiency-enhancing doctrine accords with
the mainstream view. Only a few other scholars have so much as
paused over waste law in their accounts of property. Morton J. Hor-
32 See id. at 71-74.
33 See id. at 72-73.
34 See Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 304, 311 (1846) (stating that an action
consistently practiced by regional farmers is not waste); Owen v. Hyde, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.)
334, 339 (1834) (explaining that the tenant did not commit waste "if the proportion of
wood land was such as that a prudent farmer would have considered it best to reduce a
portion of it to cultivation"); Keeler v. Eastman, 11 Vt. 293, 293-94 (1839) (stating that
tenant does not commit waste by acting "in a prudent and husbandlike manner").
35 Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227, 232-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); see Pynchon, 52
Mass. (11 Met.) at 312 ("[N]o act of a tenant will amount to waste, unless it is or may be
prejudicial to the inheritance. . . ."); Davis v. Gilliam, 40 N.C. (5 Ired. Eq.) 308, 311 (1848)
("The tenant may use the estate, but not so as to take from it its intrinsic worth."); Shine v.
Wilcox, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 631, 632 (1837) ("[T]he cutting down of timber is not
waste, unless it does a lasting damage to the inheritance .... ."); Clemence v. Steere, I R.I.
272, 274 (1850) (noting that "it is necessary to show that change is detrimental to the
inheritance" to prove waste); Owen, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) at 339 (arguing that the question to
ask in a waste case is, "[D]id [the tenant] materially injure the... estate[?]"); Keeler, 11 Vt.
at 294 (stating that the tenant may make changes to the land, but "not so as to cause
damage to the inheritance").
36 See, e.g., Clemence, 1 R.I. at 274 (stating that "it is necessary [in proving waste] to
show that the change is detrimental to the inheritance and contrary to the ordinary course
of good husbandry"); supra notes 34-35.
37 See POSNER, supra note 30, at 72-73.
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witz has argued that the evolution of waste law was part of a general
development in nineteenth-century American law toward (1) treating
land exclusively as a commodity, and (2) freeing land from both social
controls and inconvenient existing claims, held by smallholders, in or-
der to make it available as a capital-generating resource for the eco-
nomic development of the continent.38 John G. Sprankling has taken
a similar tack, but with concerns motivated by ecological conservation
rather than the Marxist account of history that then motivated Hor-
witz. 39 Sprankling contends that an "instrumentalist" view of the natu-
ral world, coupled with a perceived imperative to bring the new
continent under the axe and plough, drove the American law of waste
to develop a good husbandry standard, which allowed tenants to clear
and develop land in the interest of advancing cultivation. 40
Neither Horwitz's nor Sprankling's account is explanatorily in-
compatible with the conventional economic view of waste law that Pos-
ner propounds. They may be distinguished, however, by their
normatively founded distaste for Posner's efficiency-enhancing doc-
trine. Horwitz would believe Posner's doctrine tends to reflect the
interests of the capitalist class,41 while Sprankling sees in waste doc-
trine a lack of proper regard for the land's intrinsic worth in an un-
spoiled state.42
Against this background, I contend that courts created the Ameri-
can law of waste for several reasons: to promote efficient use of re-
sources that the English rule would have inhibited; to advance an idea
of American landholding as a republican enterprise, free of feudal
hierarchy; and perhaps to advance a belief that a natural duty to culti-
vate wild land underlay the Anglo-American claim to North America.
The complex interaction of these values in a relatively minor doctrine
is suggestive of the plurality of values at work in American land re-
gimes generally.
In Part I of this Article, I trace the transformation of waste doc-
trine from a strict English rule to a broad American standard articu-
lated in the watershed 1810 New York case of Jackson v. Brownson.43 In
Part II, I consider several interpretations of the American standard. I
argue that although it has a mixed profile as a standard promoting
efficiency in contracting, its introduction can be convincingly ex-
plained as an expression of the then-current commitments in America
38 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
54-58 (1977).
39 SeeJohn G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI.
L. RaV. 519, 533-36 (1996).
40 See id. at 534-36.
41 See HORWITZ, supra note 38, at 54-62.
42 See Sprankling, supra note 39, at 533-36.
43 7 Johns. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
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to republicanism and economic dynamism. I explore these ideas
through the thoughts of ChancellorJames Kent, who joined the Jack-
son majority, and argue that the promotion of these values in Ameri-
can waste law adds to our understanding of how a default rule can
have normative as well as efficiency-enhancing functions.
I
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WASTE DOCTRINE
A. The English Law of Waste
The English law of waste, part of the common law of real prop-
erty, approached these problems by way of a doctrine focused on the
prerogative of landowners. The doctrine set out the rights to land use
of tenants who occupied the land for a term of life. They held these
rights relative to those of the reversioner: either the landlord or the
heir who would succeed the tenant by taking the estate in fee simple.
The first statement of waste law came in 1267, when the Statute of
Marlborough set forth the following default rule: "[Farmers], during
their terms, shall not make waste, sale nor exile of [house,] woods,
men, nor of any thing belonging to the tenements that they have to
[farm] without special licence had, by writing of covenant, making
mention they may do it."44
As the meaning of the term "waste" developed, the English doc-
trine remained a close constraint on the actions that tenants could
take without the express permission of the reversioner. 45 A successful
legal action in waste resulted in treble damages and forfeiture,46 and
an injunction on conduct constituting waste was available in equity.47
The most abstract account of the law had much in common with
the direction American doctrine would take: "Whatever does a lasting
damage to the freehold or inheritance is waste, '48 wrote William
Blackstone, who elsewhere termed it "a spoil and destruction of the
estate ... by demolishing not the temporary profits only, but the very
substance of the thing; thereby rendering it wild and desolate." 49
Both Blackstone and Edward Coke, however, made clear that the law
was much more narrowly drawn in its specific requirements. These
more abstract statements arose from a disinclination in both branches
of the courts to punish tenants for trivial actions brought by landlords
44 Statute of Marlborough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 23, § 2 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
45 See generally 1 EDWARD COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 53a-53b (18th ed.
1823) (detailing the numerous and intricate restrictions on tenants' land use under waste
law).
46 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *283.
47 See 7 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 278-79 (3d ed. 1925). See
generally 3 id. at 121-22 (3d ed. 1923) (discussing traditional remedies for waste).
48 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *281.
49 3 id. at *223.
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or reversioners only to harass, which was in some tension with the
narrow and exacting requirements of the doctrine. 50 The main lines
of the law were as follows.
Unless explicitly excused, tenants could take from the land only
the timber that was necessary for maintaining buildings, making tools,
and warming themselves in winter, called respectively "house bote,"
"tool bote," and "fire bote.''5 1 Tenants were required to use deadwood
for these tasks unless none was available, 52 in which case they could
take living trees in ascending order of their quality as timber: beech
and maple first, then oak, ash, and elm. 5 3 In places where finer woods
grew widely, tenants might be free to take such poorer trees as beech
and maple without regard to bote, but nowhere in England could they
harvest oak, ash, or elm outside the strict limits of waste doctrine. 54
Lesser trees, including willows and aspens, might also be protected
where they served as windbrakes, shade trees, or ornaments, but were
otherwise susceptible to the tenant's axe. 55
Waste law similarly restricted tenants' power to change patterns
of land use. They could not erect new buildings or fences without
permission, but could only repair what they received with the land.56
Traditionally, it was no defense that a new building increased the
value of the property.57 Tenants also committed waste if they opened
new mines on the land to search for hidden minerals, 58 but they could
continue using open mines for their own use.59 Tenants could not
allow arable land to grow up into forest, transform a meadow into a
garden or the reverse, or otherwise change the uses the landowner
had established.60 Two reasons were given for this restriction: First,
changes in land-use patterns could cause confusion where deeds listed
land according to its use rather than more enduring metes and
bounds (a consideration that itself reveals the pervasive expectation of
stability in land use). And second, tenant initiative would "change the
50 See 7 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 277-78 (noting the strictness of the common
law rule); infra notes 62-64, 66.
51 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *281-82; 1 COKE, supra note 45, at 53b.
52 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *281; 1 CoKE, supra note 45, at 53a.
53 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *281-82.
54 See 1 CoKE, supra note 45, at 53a.
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *282. This restriction was largely dispensed with
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as it was seen as anachronistic and onerous.
See 7 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 277-78.
58 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *282; 1 COKE, supra note 45, at 53a.
59 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *282.
60 As Coke put it, "If the tenant convert arable land into wood, or converso, or
meadow into arable, it is waste, for it changeth not onely the course of his husbandry, but
the proofe of his evidence." 1 CoKE, supra note 45, at 53b; see also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note
5, at *282 (quoting this language from Coke).
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course of... husbandry" without the permission of the landlord. 6' To
do so was "an injury to the title of the reversioners," to their claim on
the land, and thus "a present damage to them. '62 It was possible for a
defendant to plead in defense that he had committed only "meliora-
tive waste," necessary to maintain or improve the property, but the
pleading rules were strict and courts were clear that "meliorative
waste" was waste.
63
Well after the American transformation of waste doctrine, En-
glish courts drew on their "injury to the inheritance" language to up-
hold not agricultural innovation, but the building of industrial
structures on previously open land.64 This embrace of the dynamism
of manufacturing, though, came for quite distinct reasons, and long
after American law had completed its break from English doctrine. 65
Moreover, the English industrial cases rhetorically displayed great re-
gard for the old principle of stability in agricultural practice. 66 At the
61 1 CoKE, supra note 45, at 53b.
62 The Provost and Scholars of Queen's College, Oxford v. Hallett, (1811) 14 East.
489, 491 (K.B.). In this case, the tenant "erected fences and banks[,] . . . subdivided the
same [land] into small inclosures[,] . . . [and] ploughed up and converted great part into
tillage." Id. at 490. The plaintiffs did allege that the value of the property was reduced,
which was of course material to damages, but it was not the focus of the court's inquiry. See
id. at 489-90.
63 See Simmons v. Norton, (1831) 7 Bing. 639, 646-48 (KB.). In this case, the defen-
dant had plowed a meadow and pleaded that "the meadow had become sour and mossy
through age; that it had been ploughed up according to the rules of good husbandry, sown
with barley and clover, and laid down to grass again: such a process being occasionally
necessary to restore old meadow to a healthy state." Id. at 640. The court ruled that he
had surrendered this defense by pleading no waste, rather than meliorative waste, and gave
a narrow account of what could qualify as melioration: "to meliorate or restore it to its
original quality." Id. at 648. Two concurring judges added that, "with respect to the con-
version of meadow into arable [land] . . . or into orchard," there could be no doubt that
the action was prima facie waste, and must be defended as melioration. See id. at 648-49.
64 SeeJones v. Chappell, (1875) 20 L.R.-Eq. 539 (Ch.). In this odd case, a plaintiff who
had no reversionary interest in the property concerned sought to bring an action of waste
against the tenant of a neighboring site whose industrial activity had blocked the plaintiffs
air and light. See id. at 539-41. Besides noting that such a case could not be brought as a
matter of standing, the court held that "to prove waste you must prove an injury to the
inheritance." Id. at 541; see also Meux v. Cobley, [1892] 2 Ch. 253, 262-63 (1891) (finding
that where a lease explicitly permitted agricultural activity in keeping with that of the
neighborhood and where other farmers had built greenhouses, the defendant tenant
could not be liable for waste for doing the same).
65 By "distinct reasons," I mean that the English law's embrace of manufacturing re-
flected neither the republicanism nor the imperative to clear wilderness that motivated the
American change.
66 See W. Ham Cent. Charity Bd. v. E. London Waterworks Co., [ 1900] 1 Ch. 624, 636
("If the permanent character of the property demised is not substantially altered, as for
instance, by the conversion of pasture land into plough land, by breaking up ancient mead-
ows, or the like, I conceive that the law is that it is not now waste for the tenant to do things
which within the covenants and conditions of his lease he is not precluded from doing.").
The case to which these decisions typically cite, Doe v. Earl of Burlington, (1833) 5 B. & Ad.
507, 39 R.R. 549, drew on de minimis exceptions to waste law to hold that a tenant's tear-
ing down an ancient and ruined barn was not waste, and proceeded to say that "there is no
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time of the American divergence, English waste law supported a sys-
tem in which tenants' initiative was closely constrained, their decisions
susceptible to veto, and their role on the land nearer a custodian's
than a freeholder's.
B. The Meaning of the English Rule
What sort of rule was the English law? It was, to begin with, a
default rule, always susceptible to contractual revision. As noted previ-
ously, scholars have identified several kinds of default rules, with the
most commonly discussed being the gap-filling or problem-solving de-
fault, which seeks to embed in incomplete agreements a term to
which the parties would have agreed under optimal bargaining condi-
tions.67 Where waste law prevented a tenant from taking actions that
the parties would have agreed to forbid under optimal bargaining
conditions, as was surely the case with the most destructive or oppor-
tunistic acts, it had this function. Also much discussed is the "equilib-
rium-inducing default," or "bargaining default," which provides a
term that focuses the attention of the parties on the issue it addresses
and induces them to agree to another term if the default term is not
optimal. 68 Where the strict requirements of waste doctrine induced
parties to bargain expressly over a tenant's power to exploit the rever-
sioner's land, the doctrine had this function. For example, the de-
fault rule of waste law governing the tenant's rights to minerals in the
land, 69 potentially ruinous to a reversioner, focused the landlord or
testator on the question of the tenant's right to minerals, thereby pro-
viding a strong incentive for explicit definition of that right. These
two types of default rules have the same aim: enhancing the economic
efficiency of agreements by leading bargainers to welfare-maximizing
terms. These default rules are distinguished, however, by their strate-
gies: On the one hand, the gap-filling default provides terms to which
the parties would optimally have agreed, and on the other, the bar-
authority for saying that any act can be waste which is not injurious to the inheritance." Id.
at 517. Courts continued, however, to treat changes in the course of husbandry as injuries
to the inheritance, but looked to the relevant covenant to avoid finding waste in cases of
industrial development or improving buildings. See, e.g., W Ham Cent. Charity Bd., I Ch. at
646; Meux, 2 Ch. at 260-61.
67 See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 390. As Schwartz notes, these defaults were the earli-
est that scholars identified, and have been the ones most studied. Id at 390 n.1.
68 See id. at 390. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Ineffi-
ciency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) (introducing the con-
cept of an equilibrium-inducing default). Waste law only had this character, of course,
inasmuch as it averted a less than maximally efficient use of resources; simply preventing a
transfer of resources from reversioner to tenant is not per se equilibrium-inducing (al-
though widespread expropriation would erode the landlord-tenant relationship systemi-
cally, which might have counter-efficiency effects).
69 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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gaining default induces the parties to specify those terms
themselves.7 0
Another function of default rules came to the fore when rever-
sioners used waste doctrine to preempt or punish actions that did not
reduce the value or productivity of the land, and to which they might
plausibly have agreed ex ante, but which nonetheless fell afoul of their
70 The discussion of waste doctrine through the lens of contract law raises a basic
question: What is the precise sense in which waste doctrine is property law? While the doc-
trine concerns the use of plots of land not so different from the Blackacre examples used
in property-law classes, defining "property" by its domain of objects is notoriously inade-
quate. See, e.g., LAuRA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER
11-15 (2003). In a time when those objects are increasingly heterogeneous and intangi-
ble, such an object-oriented equation would be rather like identifying "law" with those
events occurring in buildings designed by the architect Cass Gilbert. See CAss GILBERT, LIFE
AND WoRK: ARCHITECT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (Barbara S. Christen & Steven Flanders eds.,
2001) (providing perspectives on the life of Cass Gilbert and exploring the dimensions of
his work and influence). See, for example, the extremely illuminating account of this
trend and legal-theoretical responses to it in Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property,
in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY 69, 71-82 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
As a source of default rules for agreements that were often bargained over (although
not, of course, in cases involving dower rights or testamentary estates), waste doctrine has a
claim to being regarded as an aspect of contract law; it is in that area that other discussion
of default rules has appeared. Moreover, as a source of claims to damages based on eco-
nomically injurious activity, waste law has often been classified by commentators within the
law of torts. See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from Its
Past, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY, supra, at 28, 43 (noting that the first Restatement of Property
largely relegated waste to tort).
The problem is hardly unique to the law of waste. The rights of persons in things,
relative to the corresponding rights of others, are not neatly arrayed under the unitary
label "property." See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, supra, at 11-15; Grey, supra, at 81. Without tak-
ing on this problem in a systematic way, I note that my investigation of waste law is pre-
mised on one response to the difficulty: a move toward greater specificity rather than
greater generality in defining the scope of inquiry. Rather than rely on an ex ante defini-
tion of property or of legal rights in general, I have begun from a specific body of doctrine
that governs relative rights in a definite class of resources, and I have sought to illuminate
some of the values at work in that legal formation. Cf Bruce A. Ackerman, Four Questions
for Legal Theory, in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY, supra, at 351, 351 (beginning his exploration of
how lawyers construct property arguments using environmental litigation as the vehicle for
that exploration). While I cannot claim that "[i]t was Wittgenstein who led me" to my
inquiry, as Ackerman does, I do have in common with Ackerman the methodological pre-
supposition that it is valuable in seeking to understand concepts or principles to begin with
the ways in which they are actually used. See id. As Ackerman puts it, "Rather than begin a
jurisprudential study of property by asking, 'What is law?' or 'What is property?' I wanted to
ask how people used property talk." Id. In a similar vein, Amartya Sen notes that "it is hard
to judge what choices are or are not 'consistent' or 'irrational' without going in some detail
into the way the choosers see the problem and what they think they are trying to achieve."
SEN, Environmental Evaluation, supra note 21, at 538. A good deal of what is valuable in that
inquiry comes not only from the law of property (particularly its history in relation to
political thought), but also from the theory of contract law. It seems plausible that further
inquiry into the law of property and neighboring fields will benefit from similar heteroge-
neity. See Grey, supa, at 71-73, 80-81 (outlining various specialized usages of the term
"property" and suggesting that a heterogeneous conception of property rights frees tIs to
gain insight into productive ways of marrying traditional and nontraditional aspects of
property rights in social arrangements). I would not insist, however, upon a too-rapid
transition from a study of waste law to proclamations about property at large.
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prerogative. Schwartz has identified a "normative default" as one di-
recting a result that "the decision maker prefers on fairness grounds
but is unwilling to require."7 1 Schwartz's definition requires a bit of
adjustment to encompass the hierarchical character of the English
property relations that waste law governed. "Fairness" suggests a stan-
dard for individualistic bargainers who merit the equal solicitude of
the law; this was not the model of relations envisioned between te-
nants or widows in dower and their reversioners. If we instead take
"normative" in a broader sense, encompassing, among other things,
normative ideas about the basic character of social structure, 72 we can
see that such a default is normative in the specific sense that it is status-
confirming. It underscores the reversioner's superior claim to the land
and corresponding superior social status. In its status-confirming
function, waste law also tended to meet Schwartz's definition of a
"transformative default," which "is adopted to persuade parties to pre-
fer the result the rule directs"7 3-in this case, a pattern of social rela-
tions of prerogative and deference, partly organized around claims to
land. Corresponding to the broad understanding of "normative" that
I have already proposed is a broad sense of "transformatory" 74: not
just inducing bargainers to adopt a specific term within a particular
transaction, but educating parties in the structure of social authority in
which the prerogative of reversioners played a dominant role.75
71 Schwartz, supra note 26, at 391.
72 For a discussion of the ways in which complex sets of considerations can enter into
normative judgments regarding alternative social arrangements, or "social states," see
AMARTYA SEN, The Possibility of Social Choice, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 21, at
65, 76-97 [hereinafter SEN, Social Choice]. Sen considers the ways in which various mea-
sures of individual well-being may be assessed and combined, emphasizes the need for
context-specific judgments of individuals' actual capacities to lead the lives they wish to
lead, and stresses the appropriateness of regarding freedom as a multidimensional value to
be weighed in both its concern for freedom from interference by others and its concern
for affirmative capacity to live as one has reason to live. On this third issue, see also
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 27 (1999) [hereinafter SEN, DEVELOPMENT] (argu-
ing, for example, that a person may prefer to live under a free system rather than an
"unfree" system even if both systems provide the same commodities and income).
73 Schwartz, supra note 26, at 391.
74 Particularly informative on the possibility of meaningful "transformatory" activity in
the law is Sen's caution against taking people's presently existing views of their own well-
being as dispositive for the evaluation of their well-being. Sen points out, on the level of
high theory, that a part of what we mean by regarding ourselves as free and rational is that
we can evaluate, and potentially revise or replace, our present commitments and self-assess-
ment. See SEN, Introduction, supra note 21, at 14-19. On the empirical plane, Sen likewise
observes that those who are severely deprived are least likely to regard themselves as such,
while those who have some command over resources or social esteem are correspondingly
more likely to complain of their condition. See SEN, Social Choice, supra note 72, at 90-92.
75 Schwartz argues that normative and transformative rules are ill-advised ideas. A
normative default, he argues, will be incorporated into contracts only by those who already
prefer it. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 402. Choice of a default rule cannot affect the
content of agreements, but only the cost of bargaining, which increases when parties must
contract around an unpopular default. See id. Transformative rules, Schwartz notes, are
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C. The American Transformation of Waste Law in Jackson v.
Brownson
In 1810, the Supreme Court of New York76 decided Jackson v.
Brownson,77 the key case in the American transformation of waste law.
The plaintiffs, heirs of the landholder Philip Schuyler, 78 were lessors
seeking to repossess the land of a tenant for life who had allegedly
violated a covenant in his lease forbidding him to "commit any
waste." 79 The defendant, Brownson, had leased the land in 1790, at
which time it was "wild and uncultivated, and covered throughout
with a forest of heavy timber."80 By 1796, when the lessee subleased
the northern portion of the land to another farmer, Brownson had
cleared all but thirty-five of the original 133 acres, leaving twelve acres
of forest on the land he continued to lease. 8 1 Between then and the
time of the suit, Brownson did not clear more land, although he cut
timber for fuel, to build fences, and to raise a building on his farm.82
The trial court ruled in Brownson's favor on a technicality, and the
plaintiffs appealed to the New York Supreme Court to determine
whether Brownson's clearing was waste as a matter of law.8 3
likely to encounter the same difficulty, as they will more likely be resisted than accepted.
See id. at 414. Moreover, transformative rules draw contract law away from the function it
performs best and for which there is no good substitute-the facilitation of market transac-
tions-into the realm of moral education, in which many other institutions, such as relig-
ion and family, are likely to have a comparative advantage. See id. Finally, such putatively
transformative standards as conscionability and good faith are not self-interpreting, but
require the courts to supply their meaning. See id. at 415. An ex-post specification of a
standard, however, cannot achieve its transformative purpose, because that purpose re-
quires the parties to be familiar with the substance of the standard-as well as the state's
endorsement of the standard-before they contract. See id. at 413-15.
Schwartz's illuminating arguments are probably dispositive for most cases in the con-
text he addresses: agreements between "sophisticated contractors." See id. at 392. Later in
this Article, I draw on related arguments of Schwartz's to help explain the relative failure
of the standard of sustainable use in American waste law. See infra Part II.A. My concern
here, however, is not to ask what default rules should do in markets made up of sophisti-
cated contractors, but to argue about what certain default rules did do in transactions that
were deeply embedded in a system of social hierarchy in which land had great importance,
both economically and symbolically.
76 The Supreme Court was then the highest court of legal appeals in the state.
77 7 Johns. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
78 Id. at 228. The Schuyler manor sat on the eastern side of the Hudson River, about
one-third of the way from Albany to New York City. See CHARLES W. McCutRD, THE ANTI-
RENT ERA IN NEW YORK LAW AND POLITICS, 1839-1865, at 3 map.1 (2001).
79 Jackson, 7 Johns. at 228.
80 Id. at 227-28.
81 See id. at 227-29.
82 See id, at 229. There was some dispute over these facts, as the plaintiffs claimed that
Brownson had entirely cleared his portion of the land. See id. at 228.
83 See id. at 229. The trial court held that the sublease had created a new lease be-
tween Brownson and his lessor, severing the old lease, and that his actions since the new
lease began did not constitute waste. See id. at 229.
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Philip Schuyler, a general in the Continental Army and the fa-
ther-in-law of Alexander Hamilton, was a scion of one the great land-
holding families of the Hudson Valley; together these families' tenant-
inhabited property represented one of the great attempts to create a
landed aristocracy in North America.8 4 In a country that saw itself as a
nation of yeoman farmers, craftsmen, and other independent small-
holders,85 the plaintiffs, heirs of Schuyler, proposed to exercise a land-
lord's prerogative to repossess a small farmer's land. Facing a conflict
between landlord and tenant that was reminiscent of English social
relations, the court had to decide what form a doctrine of hierarchy
and prerogative would take in American land law. The result was a
three to two split in which James Kent, who would later author Kent's
Commentaries, joined the majority in creating a new and distinctly
American doctrine of waste. 86
The plaintiffs contended that the clearing of forest constituted
waste under the English rule, while the defendant denied that clear-
ing timber to make way for cultivation could count as waste. 87 The
majority ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but adopted the defendant's
interpretation of the doctrine, seizing on Blackstone's formulation
that waste was comprised of actions that did "a permanent injury to
the inheritance. '88 In England, the common law deemed harvesting
timber or changing patterns of land use to be such an injury, so a rule
lent its crystalline lines to the nominal standard; in the United States,
the doctrine would henceforth take its shape from the standard alone,
and become a source of considerable latitude for tenants.8 9 Despite
applying the more flexible standard, the Johnson court found that the
clearing was waste as a matter of law, because Brownson had cut nearly
all the wood on the estate and did not leave enough to supply timber
for farm maintenance.90
84 For a description of one of New York's largest landholding families, see McCuRD,
supra note 78, at 10-15. See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
210-11, 222 (1973) (noting reforms to New York property law in reaction to the estates on
the Hudson); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 109-22
(1992) (discussing the attempts of the American colonists to emulate the social hierarchy
of England).
85 See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 11-39 (1970) (discussing the
Republican Party's Civil War-era platform advocating for the nation's laborers, a group
that northern society at the time defined to include farmers, small businessmen, and inde-
pendent craftsmen); DREW R. McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC 62-70 (1980) (recounting
the hopes of Benjamin Franklin and other revolutionaries that Americans would remain a
"virtuous" people of farmers, artisans, and other independent laborers); WooD, supra note
84, at 271-86 (describing a second, social revolution against the American aristocracy).
86 See Jackson, 7 Johns. at 227.
87 See id. at 229-32.
88 See id. at 232-35.
89 See discussion infra Part I.D.
90 See Jackson, 7 Johns. at 232-33.
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The dissenting justices9 1 recognized the significance of the move-
ment from rule to standard, and reproached the majority for its em-
brace of vagueness. Justice Spencer, joined by Justice Yates, recited
the specific rights of bote that English waste law preserved for tenants,
and continued:
I insist that, according to the common law of England, no tenant can
cut down timber, &c. or clear land for agricultural purposes; and
that the quantity of timber cut down never enters into the consider-
ation whether waste has or has not been committed; but that it is
always tested by the act of cutting timber, without the justifiable ex-
cuse of having done it for house-bote, fire-bote, plough-bote or fence-
bote. A single tree cut down, without such justifiable cause, is waste
as effectually as if a thousand had been cut down; and the reason is
this, that such trees belong to the owner of the inheritance, and the
tenant has only a qualified property in them for shade and
shelter.9 2
The dissenters did not propose that such restrictions would be
desirable in the American setting; indeed, they pointed out that the
rule was "inapplicable to a new, unsettled country"-meaning by "in-
applicable" not powerless, but unsuitable.93 The dissenters' point,
rather, was that the common law rule, with its clear prerogatives and
prohibitions, alerted all parties to their rights, while the new Ameri-
can standard required courts to engage in the uncertain business of
distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate uses of land.
"The criterion set up by the plaintiff [and adopted by the court] ," they
argued, "is altogether fanciful and vague; and the case shows, that
men differ very widely as to how much woodland ought to be left for
the use of a farm." 94 By contrast, "[t]he rule furnished by the com-
mon law is fixed and certain." 95 That certainty created clear back-
ground conditions for bargaining: "If the parties before us intended
that a sufficient quantity of timber should be left for the use of the
farm, it was very easy to have inserted a covenant to that effect. '9 6
Replacing a clear rule with a "fanciful and vague" standard created
undesirable uncertainty: "[I]f a covenant not to commit waste is here-
91 The advocates of a stricter definition of waste were in the dissent, despite the ma-
jority's agreement that waste had occurred in the instant case, because they agreed with
the trial court that the defendant's sublease of a portion of his land to a third party had
annulled the original agreement with Schuyler, which provided for forfeiture upon waste.
They accordingly contended that there was no basis for a forfeiture action and that the
plaintiffs therefore should have sought damages instead. See id. at 235-37 (Spencer, J.,
dissenting).
92 Id. at 236-37.
93 Id. at 237.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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after to be considered as a covenant to leave a sufficient quantity of
land in wood, no lessee is safe" from the shifting opinions of courts
and juries on a matter better left to freely contracting parties. 97
The dissenters, however, had lost. The American standard of
waste was now "permanent injury" or "material prejudice" to the
inheritance.
D. The Formulations of the American Standard
Jackson v. Brownson was the progenitor of a line of state supreme
court cases adopting the same standard, with some variation in the
wording of the formula. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that
"[i] n this country, it is difficult to imagine any exception to the gen-
eral rule of law, that no act of a tenant will amount to waste, unless it is
or may be prejudicial to the inheritance, or to those entitled to the
reversion or remainder."98 In Tennessee, when determining whether
a widow with a life estate had committed waste, the supreme court
asked, "[D]id she materially injure the dower estate thereby?" 99 In
Rhode Island, to succeed in an action of waste, the supreme court
97 See id. Morton Horwitz takes a different view of the dissent's position. In Horwitz's
view, "[t]he dissenting minority wanted to go still farther in changing the law to suit the
necessities of development[,] ... [hoping to] sever[ I entirely the right to property from
the right to prevent tenants from completely altering the estate." HORWITZ, supra note 38,
at 55. There is some ambiguity as to just what the dissent intended to propose. As Horwitz
rightly notes, the dissent would have refused to apply the English rule of waste in an action
for forfeiture, based on an interpretive principle: "[I]n construing a covenant which is to
work a forfeiture, courts adhere strictly to the precise words of the condition, in order to
prevent the forfeiture." Jackson, 7Johns. at 235 (Spencer, J., dissenting). Because the dis-
senters regarded the majority's standard as vague and unreliable, they would have ruled
that waste doctrine could not be invoked in actions of forfeiture or ejectment. See id. In an
action for damages, however, the dissent observed that "then indeed we should have a
right to give the covenant not to commit waste a greater latitude of construction." Id. at
237. This suggests that the dissent did not imagine such covenants to be void as to dam-
ages, but only as to forfeiture. It is in the context of this hypothetical discussion that the
dissent rejected the majority's standard as "fanciful and vague" and praised the clarity of
the English common law rule. See id.
Unfortunately, the nature of Jackson v. Brownson makes it difficult to discern what the
dissent believed should be the default rule of waste, since the case dealt not with defaults
but with the interpretation of a contractual covenant. Although the dissent praised the
clarity of the common law rule and denounced that rule as a basis for forfeiture, it did not
say what it regarded as the appropriate default.
98 Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 304, 312 (1846) (holding that cutting a new
road through land and breaking up a meadow into cropland were not waste as a matter of
law, while the issue of whether draining and raising a wetland constituted waste was ajury
question).
9 Owen v. Hyde, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 334, 339 (1834) (holding that a widow with a
dower estate could cut timber for profit, even where it was not necessary to her support,
where such cutting did not do a permanent injury to the estate and was consistent with the
use a prudent person would make of the land-particularly where certain of the timbering
brought land under cultivation to replace cleared land that had been exhausted by
cropping).
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held that "it [was] necessary to show that the change [was] detrimen-
tal to the inheritance." 10 0 In North Carolina, "the cutting down of
timber [was] not waste, unless it [did] a lasting damage to the inheri-
tance, and deteriorate[d] its value; and not then, if no more was cut
down than was necessary for the ordinary enjoyment of the land." 0 1
Under Vermont law, the tenant could act freely, but "not so as to
cause damage to the inheritance."'10 2
The Jackson majority did take care to connect its interpretation of
the doctrine with the English common law rule, and tried to show that
its articulation of the doctrine did not vary from the common law.
The majority made much of the space created by the ecological varia-
tion in the English doctrine, which protected trees in timber-poor ar-
eas that would have been free for cutting in regions with better stocks
of trees. 1 0 3 Because "[w] hat kind of wood in England is deemed to be
timber depends upon the custom of the country[, and] [w]ood which
in some counties is called timber is not so in others," the court con-
cluded that "the prohibition [on cutting timber in England], in prin-
ciple, extends no further . . . there than it does here." 10 4 The
principle which allegedly joined the two continents was the following:
"[W]henever wood has been cut in such a manner as materially to
prejudice the inheritance, it is waste. '10 5
Bolstered by American precedent, however, the cases that fol-
lowed displayed none of Jackson's pretense that the American standard
simply perpetuated the principle of the English rule. Instead, the
opinions are studded with such phrases as "the law must necessarily be
100 Clemence v. Steere, 1 R.I. 272, 274 (1850). The court in this case adhered to a
standard in which waste was that which "injured the farm, or was such a change as no good
farmer would make." Id. The court ruled that cutting timber for sale from an estate was
ordinarily waste, but that ajury might find it not so where, as here, the sale was to support a
widow with a testamentary life estate. See id. at 275. The court ruled that cutting hoop-
poles (timber in the early stages of growth) was waste unless doing so was ordinary practice
in the area; that permitting land to grow up in brush was not waste unless it met the
abstract American standard, although it would have been waste in England, where land was
at a relative premium; and, perhaps reassuringly, that a tenant could tear down a barn so
dilapidated that it threatened to collapse on her cow. See id. at 274-76. The court also
noted that a finding of waste could lead to forfeiture, but only of the particular area of the
land wasted, such as a woodlot or a meadow. See id. at 276-77.
101 Shine v. Wilcox, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 631, 632 (1837) (holding that a widow
and her new husband had not committed waste by clearing some seventy acres of forest for
cultivation because there was an expectation that widows should be able to clear land for
their support, and because clearing forest to replace exhausted land was customary in the
vicinity).
102 Keeler v. Eastman, 11 Vt. 293, 294 (1839) (holding that clearing timber to open
land to cultivation is not waste if it comports with husbandlike behavior, because it does no
permanent injury to the estate).
103 SeeJackson v. Brownson, 7Johns. 227, 233-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 234.
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varied in this country from the English doctrine .... [as] it would be
absurd to apply the rigid principles of the English law to a state of
things wholly variant from theirs"; 0 6 "whatever may be [the] law of
England, it is not in this Commonwealth waste, unless it may be preju-
dicial to the plaintiff'; 10 7 and "[w]hile our ancestors brought over to
this country the principles of the common law .... [i] t would have
been absurd to hold that the clearing of the forest, so as to fit it for
the habitation and use of man was waste."' 0 8 The Jackson majority's
pretense of continuity could end because the change to which the
dissenters objected had triumphed.
1. The Standard of Material Injury
What did it mean, in the words of Jackson v. Brownson's principle,
"materially to prejudice the inheritance"?' 0 9 The rule could not be so
simple as to require that the property go to the reversioner with worth
equal to or greater than its value at the time the tenant occupied it,
for that would be both over- and under-inclusive, excusing tenants
who increased the value of the estate yet committed waste, while
sweeping in others who diminished the value of the estate, but were
not deemed to have committed waste. On the one hand, in Jackson,
the cleared land was worth considerably more than the land as wild
timber, 110 yet the court found waste as a matter of law because the
tenant had left less timber than was necessary for the upkeep of the
place."' A tenant, then, could commit waste while increasing the
value of the land if he compromised the capacity of the reversioner to
provide the needs of the place from its own soil. On the other hand,
even under the English rule, a tenant who cut timber for fire-bote and
then ended his tenancy would have diminished somewhat the value of
the land, but not committed waste. 112 A reduction in the value of the
estate, then, was not always a necessary condition of waste, nor was it
sufficient to constitute waste. Whether waste had occurred depended
more on a concept of appropriate use than on whether the estate's
value had increased, decreased, or held constant.
In 1848, the North Carolina Supreme Court made a particular
effort to formulate the standard of "material prejudice" as a general
principle. The court found that a widow holding a life estate could
sometimes clear timber for cultivation, but could not undertake an
106 Owen v. Hyde, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 334, 339-40 (1834).
107 Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 304, 311-12 (1846) (observing that adopt-
ing the English rule would arrest "the progress of improvement" in the United States).
108 Shine v. Wilcox, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 631, 632 (1837).
109 Jackson, 7 Johns. at 234.
110 See id. at 229.
11I See id. at 234.
112 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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operation of draining turpentine from living pine trees, because
"[t] he tenant may use the estate, but not so as to take from it its intrin-
sic worth."' 1 3 The court held that turpentine production was analo-
gous to mining, which "is not a thing yielding a regular profit in the
way of production from year to year from labor, but it would be taking
away the land itself."114 In either turpentine production or excessive
timbering, the tenant "takes.. . not the product of the estate arising
in his own time, but he takes that which nature has been elaborating
through ages, being a part of the inheritance itself."115 This was a
kind of usufructuary standard, and it recurred in the jurisprudence of
North Carolina, as in the state supreme court's 1888 dictum that "it
may be proper to fix a limit to the denudation, that it do not exceed
the annual increase from natural growth which replaces that portion
of the trees removed."' 16 The formula was also quoted approvingly by
the Supreme Court of Georgia. 17
2. The Standard of Husbandry
For reasons developed later, the principle of sustainable use
tended in practice to remain abstract and vague, while courts resolved
waste cases by another standard, which they presented as either synon-
ymous or conjunctive with the prohibition on "permanent injury" or
"material prejudice." This was the standard of husbandry, or of the
prudent farmer.' 18 By this standard, a tenant's actions were not waste
if they comported with the behavior of a prudent fee-owner using his
land for profit. This standard appealed not to objective agronomic
principles, but to the custom of the area where the dispute took
place.' 19 To a substantial degree, it was treated as a question for ju-
ries rather than courts. 120
While also reciting the standard that waste was prejudice to the
inheritance, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that because "it
has been the constant usage of our farmers ... to change the use and
113 Davis v. Gilliam, 40 N.C. (5 Ired. Eq.) 308, 311 (1848).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 312.
116 King v. Miller, 6 S.E. 660, 666 (N.C. 1888) (holding that clearing land for cultiva-
tion was not waste where this was the ordinary practice of the neighborhood).
117 SeeSmith v. Smith, 31 S.E. 135, 136 (Ga. 1898) (holding that a widow might not cut
timber for sale where this was neither the ordinary practice of local farmers nor necessary
to the enjoyment of the homestead). This case appears to be part of the retrenchment of
waste doctrine in a conservative form in the later nineteenth century.
118 See, e.g., Owen v. Hyde, 14 Tenn. (6Yer.) 334, 339 (1834) ("[1f the proportion of
wood land was such as that a prudent farmer would have considered it best to reduce a
protion of it to cultivation . .. such clearing would not be waste.")
119 See, e.g., Shine v. Wilcox, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 631, 632 (1837) (holding that
the question of waste depended partly on "the ordinary use made of the trees in the part of
the country where the land is situated").
120 See, e.g.,Jackson v. Brownson, 7Johns. 227, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
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cultivation of their lands, as occasions have required," that action
could not be waste. 2 1 Vermont's supreme court, while claiming the
"permanent injury" standard as law, found no waste where the court
was "satisfie [d] . .. that the farm ... has been managed by the tenant
for life, in a prudent and husbandlike manner." 122 Tennessee made
the standard of "material injury" specific thus: "[I]f the proportion of
wood land was such as that a prudent farmer would have considered it
best to reduce a portion of it to cultivation," then there was no waste
in cutting timber. 23 In Rhode Island, in contrast to the strict English
rule, "it [was] necessary [for waste] to show that the change [was]
detrimental to the inheritance and contrary to the ordinary course of
good husbandry." 1
2 4
II
THE MEANING OF THE AMERICAN STANDARD
What was the character of the American standard? Once again, it
may be helpful to identify the mischief the changed doctrine was in-
tended to prevent and the functions it assumed in addressing that mis-
chief. The core mischief remained the negligent, opportunistic, or
larcenous acts of a tenant who lacked incentive to maximize presently
discounted long-term returns from the estate, and so took actions in-
consistent with the interest of the reversioner. The question was how
to mediate between the reversioner and a troublesome tenant in a
setting where land use was dynamic and few, if any, settled patterns
could be expected to persist from decade to decade. The Jackson ma-
jority seems to have believed that the new standard would create suffi-
cient flexibility to accommodate changing patterns of land use while
protecting reversioners.125 The dissenters objected that the new stan-
dard was unnecessary, because the old rule served perfectly well as a
bargain-inducing default, and counterproductive, because the content
of the new standard was indefinite and likely to shift with the opinions
of courts and juries.' 26
A. Efficiency-Enhancing Economic Explanation I: The American
Standard as a Problem-Solving Default?
The argument in favor of the American standard as a problem-
solving default-one that fills gaps in contracts with welfare-maximiz-
121 Pynchon v. Steams, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 304, 311 (1846).
122 Keeler v. Eastman, 11 Vt. 293, 293 (1839).
123 Owen, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) at 339.
124 Clemence v. Steere, 1 R.I. 272, 274 (1850).
125 See Jackson, 7 Johns. at 233 (holding that, given "the different state of many parts of
our country, timber may, and must be cut down to a certain extent, but not so as to cause an
irreparable injury to the reversioner").
126 See id. at 237 (Spencer, J., dissenting).
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ing terms-runs this way: The tenant is interested in maximizing his
profit from the estate during his tenure, while the reversioner is inter-
ested in maximizing the value of the estate when he receives it. The
overlap of the two sets of interests lies in improvements to the land
that both increase the tenant's profit and increase (or at least do not
"materially" diminish) the value of the estate upon its transfer to the
reversioner. The American standard is designed to embrace such im-
provements-the paradigm of which is the clearing of wilderness for
cultivation-while preserving the English rule's prohibition on tenant
activity that diminishes the estate's value through action or neglect. 127
Under optimal bargaining conditions, the assumption goes, tenant
and reversioner should agree to activity in this zone of overlap. So far
as this is true, the American standard should serve as an effective
problem-solving or gap-filling default.
American courts envisioned this flexibility in contrast to the fixity
of the English rule, which they saw as potentially locking the tenant
into existing land-use patterns and forbidding the mutually beneficial
activity that the American standard embraces. Some courts asserted in
adopting or explaining the American standard that retaining the En-
glish rule might impose stasis on land-use patterns, even locking up
portions of the country in wilderness.1 28 To view the matter in this
way, however, is to neglect the distinction between a default rule,
which is susceptible to contractual revision, and a mandatory rule,
which withdraws certain questions from the discretion of the con-
tracting parties. 129 An important function of the English rule was
that, as a default rule, it locked no one into anything, but served only
as a backdrop to bargaining. Parties incorporated the rule into their
agreements only by declining to specify alternative terms.
Despite its rhetorical currency, the image of a continent tied up
in primeval forest was always a bogeyman; no one seems to have ar-
gued seriously that the clearing of frontier land should be regarded as
waste. The plaintiffs' attorneys in Jackson volunteered at trial that al-
though "[t]here is no reason why the English rule should not be
strictly applied to lands under cultivation in this country[,] ... in re-
gard to wild lands it ought not to be carried to the same extent."130
The jurists who defended the American reform of waste doctrine were
protecting a westward movement of clearing and settlement that
127 See supra Part I.C-D.
128 See, e.g., Pynchon v. Steams, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 304, 311 (1846) ("That the princi-
ple of [the English rule] under consideration was... inapplicable to the condition of the
country is obvious.. . ."); Jackson, 7 Johns. at 233 (contrasting the inflexible English rule
with the need for adaptability in the race to tame the American wilderness).
129 See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 390-91 (discussing a number of defaults, as opposed
to immutable rules).
130 Jackson, 7 Johns. at 230.
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needed no protection: A rationally self-interested reversioner would
not insist on keeping a plot of land in wilderness unless relative prop-
erty values shifted so that at least some of the land had become more
valuable in timber than after clearing. Any invocation of the English
rule would have been to prevent clearing of a plot of land in a manner
that jeopardized future productive use, which the doctrine of hus-
bandry tended to forbid in the American context, or as an opportunis-
tic device to expropriate wealth from the tenant by damages or
forfeiture (a possibility which I discuss shortly).
Moreover, there is some reason to believe that the American stan-
dard, despite its initial promise to capture the zones of overlapping
interest shared by tenant and reversioner, functioned rather poorly as
a gap-filling or problem-solving default. As Alan Schwartz has sug-
gested, a problem-solving default should be assessed by three related
considerations: whether it (1) solves a problem that a reasonable por-
tion of contractors will face (2) in a way that is acceptable to those
contractors and (3) in a manner that is guided by accessible or deter-
minable information. 13 1 A default that does not address any actually
occurring problem is a waste of effort and other resources, one that
addresses problems in a way not acceptable to the parties will not sur-
vive in the marketplace, and one whose application is not guided by
accessible information cannot determine a solution that fulfills its
problem-solving purpose. 132
Here I concentrate on the first criterion, although I take up the
third later. Can the problem be expected to arise in a way the Ameri-
can standard is particularly well suited to address? The problem of
opportunistic tenants would of course arise anywhere, but the Ameri-
can standard was not superior to the English rule in stopping those
tenants; its special capacity was meant to distinguish between such te-
nants and others whose changes in land use were beneficial or neutral
to the reversioner.133 Assuming that the parties negotiated rationally,
however, there is every reason to expect that they would agree ex ante
to changes they regarded as mutually beneficial, such as clearing wil-
derness or changing cropping patterns, and revisit the agreement to
pursue mutually beneficial opportunities that arose after the initial
agreement. This is the sort of bargaining the Jackson dissenters envi-
sioned as induced by retention of the English rule.134 Under this view,
the American standard may actually have tended to produce the prob-
lem it was meant to solve by lulling inattentive parties into accepting
131 See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 392.
132 See id.
133 See, e.g., Pynchon, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) at 311 (advocating a standard that distin-
guished between harmful acts of waste and acts that changed the state of the property but
did not cause injury to the reversioner's inheritance).
134 See Jackson, 7 Johns. at 237 (Spencer, J., dissenting).
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its indeterminate principle rather than bargaining ex ante. That courts
applying the standard had no special aptitude for solving the ex post
problems the American standard may have induced would only have
exacerbated the difficulty.
The Jackson dissenters were not alone in recognizing the value of
the English rule, and the disutility of its American replacement, in this
respect. American courts retained the English law of waste for miner-
als,13 -5 apparently as an equilibrium-inducing or bargaining default,
just as the Jackson dissenters proposed to do with the law of waste for
renewable resources in land. In 1852, plaintiffs invited the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court to apply the same standard to mining that
American courts had adopted for other forms of land use: that te-
nants' use "cannot seriously impair the inheritance," as determined by
"the nature and condition of the estate, and the circumstances of the
parties."' 3 6 The court declined to do so, and preserved the English
rule, not on grounds of traditionalism but as a basis for bargaining
among free parties.' 3 7 The testator might not have envisioned that
the tenant for life would exhaust the coal mine in question, the court
noted, and its unexpected use to exhaustion might disadvantage the
reversioner, but
when the donor did not see proper to restrain the gift, how shall it
be done? Surely courts have no such control over the arrangements
which people choose to make of their affairs .... And I cannot see
how the enterprise of the citizen is to be restrained by judicial
process.138
The court continued by urging that "we . . . get ourselves freer from
the notions derived from feudal subordination,"'13 9 which evidently
was how some exponents of free contract had come to regard the doc-
trine of waste, with its judicial imposition of a standard of appropriate
land use. 140 The Pennsylvania court's means of advancing free con-
tract, ironically, was through preservation of the older English rule as
a clear default rule for a society in which free agreement should be
the governing principle.14 ' I have found no American jurisdiction in
135 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
136 Neel v. Neel, 19 Pa. 323, 326 (1852).
137 See id. at 327-29.
138 Id. at 328.
139 Id.
140 Cf., e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Land Use and the Study of Early American History, 94 YALE
LJ. 717, 738 (1985) (book review) (comparing legally imposed duties on owners of ecolog-
ically sensitive land or historic buildings to the "feudal scheme" of land ownership).
141 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed this principle two years later in Irwin v.
Covode, holding that if tenant use exhausted a mineral deposit, "it would be no more than
occurs in every life estate in chattels which perish with the using. So long as the estate is
used according to its nature . . . it is no valid objection that the use is consumption of it."
24 Pa. 162, 167 (1854). The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the right of a tenant for life
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which the English rule of waste for minerals underwent significant
change. In sum, then, reasons both general to defaults and specific to
the development of waste doctrine give cause to doubt the utility of
the American standard as a problem-solving or gap-filling default.
B. Efficiency-Enhancing Economic Explanation II: Breaking
Bilateral Monopolies
There is, then, some reason to doubt that the American standard
was more efficient than its English predecessor at producing operative
contracts that reflected the terms to which each party would have
agreed under optimal conditions. A related economic explanation
exists, however, which falls somewhat further from courts' account of
the American standard, but which is nonetheless facially plausible.
The standard might have worked to avoid certain transaction costs
and unconsummated bargains that the English rule might have pro-
duced. 142 The English rule created bilateral monopolies, in which
both tenants and reversioners enjoyed a kind of veto over improve-
ments to the estate. The tenant, of course, could simply refuse to
make an improvement. The reversioner could refuse to approve an
improvement, and then institute a waste action if the tenant, seeking
the profit of the improvement, made it anyway. Even where the exer-
cise of such a veto would reduce the value of the estate to both parties,
tenant and reversioner might reach an impasse in bargaining over the
distribution of the added income from the improvement. 4- The
American standard theoretically fixed that problem by replacing the
reversioner's veto with a trump for the tenant, who could make the
improvement, collect the resulting income, and resist an action for
waste on the ground that her change would not materially diminish
the expected value of the estate to the reversioner.
At least two cases in particular are susceptible to this explanation,
although only one has a result supporting the hypothesis. In Pynchon
v. Stearns, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found no waste in the
activity of a tenant who had cut drainage ditches, dug cellars, and fil-
led in wetlands. 144 The court remarked that preventing such action,
though it would accord with the "ancient doctrine of waste," would
to exploit without limit a reservoir of salt-impregnated water, and, because the salt works
required firewood for fuel, to cut as much timber as was necessary. Findlay v. Smith, 20 Va.
(6 Munf.) 134, 138 (1818).
142 Richard Posner concentrates his economic account of waste doctrine on this expla-
nation. See POSNER, supra note 30, at 72-73.
143 Imagine, for instance, that the improvement involved clearing land of salable tim-
ber; even if the reversioner were willing to let the tenant take the profit from the improve-
ment during her tenancy, the reversioner might still insist on taking the income from the
timber, and the tenant might refuse.
144 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 304, 310 (1846).
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"greatly impede the progress of improvement, without any compensat-
ing benefit." 145 This policy of approving tenants' changes in land use
was put to a sterner test in Livingston v. Reynolds, 146 an 1841 New York
case, where it buckled. There the defendant, a life tenant whose lease
expressly forbade waste, had built a brick kiln and cut all but eight or
ten of one hundred and eighty acres of forest to fire it, when the re-
versioner won an injunction to block his activity. 147 New York's Chan-
cellor dissolved the injunction, ruling that building and firing a kiln
was not contrary to good husbandry.' 4 The Court for the Correction
of Errors reversed the Chancellor emphatically, remarking sarcasti-
cally that "brick-bote for sale is, I believe, unknown to the common law,
as it is to all other law.' 49 If the Chancellor considered brick-making
compatible with good husbandry, the court contended, "the peculiar
ideas of the Chancellor of good husbandry . . . must differ materially
from the generally received opinion of the world," as must his idea of
waste.150  The overwhelming consideration distinguishing the two
cases, however, appears to be judicial hesitation to permit a tenant to
impose a qualitative change in land use on a reversioner, even when
the change arguably improved the overall value of the estate.15 1 It was
relatively uncontroversial that clearing timber for cultivation repre-
sented improvement, at least during the early years of the American
standard, but the standard's originators seem not to have considered
the potential application to more controversial changes, such as a ten-
ant's erection of a semi-industrial facility on formerly forested land.
While the former type of change brought land from wilderness into
the ambit of civilized activity, the latter may have imposed too much
on the reversioner, whose superior estate might have given him the
expectation of some input in deciding whether to abandon agricul-
tural use or supplement it with something entirely different. 152
145 Id. at 312.
146 26 Wend. 115 (N.Y. 1841).
147 See id. at 115-16.
148 See id. at 116-17.
149 Id. at 121 (opinion of the President of the Senate).
150 Id. at 121-22.
151 It may be, of course, that the Chancellor simply botched his evaluation of the facts
in this case, as operating a brick kiln on a mid-sized plot of land is not well characterized as
a renewable use of resources, but instead imposes a drastic and rapid drain on those re-
sources, which will likely require decades to restore themselves. This explanation would be
compatible with the one I advance, although it is not required.
152 I believe this to be a more accurate characterization of the mood of courts in apply-
ing waste doctrine than Horwitz's view that courts were inclined to strip reversioners of any
say respecting changes in land use in the interest of promoting development. For an ex-
planation of my difference with Horwitz regardingJackson, which he relies upon heavily for
this argument, see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
The hesitation to embrace tenants' changes from agricultural to industrial genres of
land use, while endorsing improvements within general categories of use, is compatible
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Moreover, the respective vetoes of the tenant and reversioner re-
garding improvements would not be symmetrical in a situation in
which the tenant could not make an adequate living from the land
without installing the improvement in question-for instance, in the
initial clearing of forest for cultivation. Because the Jackson court had
such a situation in mind, it may have deliberately made a distributive
choice in favor of the tenant by removing the landlord's power to
force a strapped tenant to hand over, say, any income from the sale of
cleared timber in the course of this initial cutting. To propose that
courts had this distributive issue in mind would be to give a rather
more restricted account of the "bilateral monopoly" explanation than
the one I suggested at the beginning of this subpart, and one con-
cerned at least as much with fairness as with welfare maximization.
1 53
C. The Pluralist Addition I: Republicanism
The second efficiency-enhancing explanation, concerned with bi-
lateral monopolies, has some force, particularly in its more restricted
version focused on distributive issues. But there is good reason to be-
lieve that it was not the whole story, and that distinct and complemen-
tary purposes also motivated the courts. 154  Recall the status-
confirming function of the English rule in its aspect as a normative
default, 155 and its corresponding educative function as a quasi-trans-
formative default. 156 In light of the analysis above, with its suggestion
that self-interested negotiators would tend to converge on the same
zone of overlapping interests that the American standard sought to
define and secure from the interference of reversioners, consider the
circumstances under which the English rule would actually be in-
with the drift of the English cases from the late nineteenth century that I discuss in note
64, supra.
153 In either a stronger or a weaker version, such an explanation nicely complements
the account of waste doctrine as a reflection of a normative commitment to dynamism in
land use, which I discuss below. See infra Part II.D.
154 In describing an explanation founded in political values as "complementary" to
one founded in economic efficiency, rather than competing, I have in mind two related
considerations. The first is that the explanation of behavior, including but not limited to
that ofjudges and other public officials, can legitimately look both to those persons' assess-
ments of their self-interest and to their social and political values, and that the latter may
be particularly important in explaining decisions affecting the basic terms of an area of
law. On this point generally, see SEN, Introduction, supra note 21, at 22-26. For specific
ways in which the valuation of social states and their institutional arrangements may be
distinct from market valuations, see SEN, Environmental Evaluation, supra note 21, at 540-42.
The second consideration is that, despite the contrast just noted, economic systems are
deeply implicated in certain social values and are properly and without distortion viewed in
relation to those values, as I discuss in some detail below. For an illuminating discussion of
this issue, see generally AMARTYA SEN, Markets and Freedoms, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM,
supra note 21, at 501, 501-27 [hereinafter SEN, Markets].
155 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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voked. In addition to spoliation by an opportunistic or neglectful ten-
ant, which the English and American defaults both prevent, and cases
of impasse or abuse arising from bilateral monopoly, reversioners
would tend to invoke waste law as an expression of prerogative-to
block changes in land use which did not comport with their aesthetic
or other noneconomic preferences, or to underscore their social su-
periority to a highly ambitious and excessively self-regarding tenant.
Consider how the judges in Jackson might have viewed such a use
of the doctrine. As noted,1 57 the plaintiffs were the heirs of Philip
Schuyler, a member of the landholding aristocracy of the Hudson Val-
ley.158 The Hudson Valley landlords' relations to their tenants were
characterized by pervasive social and political hierarchy: 159 In the sev-
enteenth century, some set up manorial courts in the manner of En-
glish lords;160 well into the nineteenth century, they controlled their
tenants' votes as blocs and confounded the newly introduced secret
ballot by distributing premarked ballots and asking tenants to fold the
ballots into a distinctive shape for instant identification. 161 The classic
form of the Hudson Valley deed was the oxymoronic "lease-in-fee,"
which combined periodic rent with an open-ended, heritable claim
on the land; 162 until its nineteenth-century judicial abolition, such a
deed included a payment to the landlord of one-quarter the price a
tenant fetched by transferring his interest. 163 Annual rent included
157 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
158 See McCuRDV, supra note 78, at 10. Lawrence M. Friedman notes that eliminating
the "feudal" and "tyrannical" aspects of the English common law from American property
law was particularly urgent for New Yorkers because of the presence of the Hudson Valley
estates. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 84, at 210-11.
159 For a discussion of the difficulties faced by Hudson Valley aristocrats, among
others, in maintaining their social status, see WOOD, supra note 84, at 113-15. Wood pro-
vides a rich description of the aristocratic cast of pre-revolutionary American society. See id.
at 11-92; see also McCuRDv, supra note 78, at 1-31 (describing the aristocracies that con-
trolled the Hudson Valley and the political and social forces that would lead to their de-
mise); Eric Kades, The End of the Hudson Valley's Peculiar Institution: The Anti-Rent Movement's
Politics, Social Relations, and Economics, 27 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 941 (2002) (detailing the
social, political, and economic forces that led to the weakening of the Hudson Valley aris-
tocrats' hold over tenants).
160 See Kades, supra note 159, at 942.
161 See id. at 950.
162 See id. at 942; McCuRDy, supra note 78, at 22-23.
163 See McCuRDY, supra note 78, at 1. Two legal theories jockeyed to sustain this unor-
thodox form of leasehold. See id. at 24-31. Parliament's act of Quia Emptores in 1290
established the free alienability of freeholders' land and forbade the creation of new feudal
obligations upon sale. See id. at 25-27. This act, however, had not been in force in New
York at the time the lease-in-fee estates were created, because New York was won from the
Dutch by conquest-meaning the law of England did not automatically travel there-and
the state legislature did not adopt its own version of Quia Emptores until 1787, when it
passed the Act Concerning Tenures. See id. at 27. Under the other theory, which the New
York Supreme Court adopted, lease-in-fee deeds took their validity from the principle of
freedom of contract, which authorized the deed-making parties to institute whatever terms
they saw fit. See id. at 28-31. It is clearly paradoxical that on this account, the liberal
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such feudal remnants as one day's labor with a horse and cart or a
tribute of "four fat fowl."1 64 Although the record in Jackson does not
contain the term "lease-in-fee," the majority noted that Brownson's
lease was for life, and that "the lessee covenants for himself, his heirs
and assigns," strongly suggesting that it was such a deed.'
165
Unsurprisingly, as a result of these restrictions, the heritable
rental estate became the flashpoint of sustained legal, political, and
sometimes paramilitary conflict in New York several decades afterJack-
son. 166 Consider how the republican strain in early American politics
must have viewed these distinctly feudal property relations. "Republi-
can," as a category of political thought, has been put to such varied
uses by theorists, historians, and polemicists that one cannot draw a
highly specific meaning out of it.1 6 7 Nonetheless, the broad strokes of
the position are clear: In politics, republicanism signified a rejection
of monarchy, aristocratic government, and the dominance of dynastic
families in favor of the equal, basic political rights of each citizen (or
landholding citizen) and a vision of authority as ultimately founded
on the consent of the governed. 168 In economics, republicanism rep-
resented rejection of feudal relations of authority and subordination
in favor of personal independence, and was variously understood as
the condition of the free laborer, the yeoman landholder, or the
merchant or entrepreneur. 169 Finally, in culture, republicanism em-
bodied a regard for ordinary individuals, combined with a belief (in
some cases half a tenuous hope) that they would prove to be the true
doctrine of freedom of contract actually legitimated quasi-feudal arrangements and specifi-
cally limited the free alienation of land.
164 See id. at 1.
165 Jackson v. Brownson, 7Johns. 227, 232 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (emphasis added).
166 See McCURDY, supra note 78, at xiii, 1-31.
167 See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
22-54 (enlarged ed. 1992); McCoy, supra note 85, at 48-75 (considering the attempts of
Americans at the time of the Revolution to reconcile views of republicanism based on
classical antiquity with the realities of American society); WOOD, supra note 84, at 95-109
(describing the pervasive, and sometimes hybrid and confused, character of republican
ideology in England); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 65 (noting that the republicanism of the American Revolution and the time
shortly after was more the spirit of a political order than its institutions).
168 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 84, at 77-92 (describing political order in eighteenth-
century America), 95-109 (describing the rise of republican ideas of political authority).
169 See FONER, supra note 85, at 11-39; McCoy, supra note 85, at 32-47, 67-75. A very
important distinction is present here between the early republican disdain for the crafts-
man or merchant in favor of the yeoman, a view derived in important respects from feudal
values, see McCoy, supra note 85, at 39-40, and the later celebration of the free laborer and
entrepreneur as the exemplary, independent bearer of modern liberty, see FONER, supra
note 85, at 11-39.
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repository of virtues long identified with aristocracy: honor, dignity,
and courage.170
The republican ideas present in the Commentaries of New York's
Chancellor James Kent, the conservative Federalist who joined the
Jackson majority, are relevant here 7 1 -particularly his view of the role
of land in social and political relations. 72 My point in examining
170 See McCoy, supra note 85, at 48-75 (describing a more robust view of republican
virtue); WOOD, supra note 84, at 229-43 (describing the uneasy relationship of egalitarian
ideology and loyalty to ideas of virtue derived from aristocratic ideals).
171 See WOOD, supra note 84, at 268-70 for a sketch of Kent's conservatism, which
included a defense of property qualifications for voters. See also ALEXANDER, supra note 20,
at 127-57 (examining Kent's contributions to early American property law).
172 Gregory Alexander presents an illuminating and provocative account of Kent's le-
gal, political, ahd social views in Chapter 5 of Commodity & Propriety: Competing Visions of
Property in American Legal Thought 1776-1970. See ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 127-57. 1
part company with his characterization in one important respect. For Alexander, Kent is a
man between worlds, a celebrant of the new commercial order, indebted to Adam Smith's
political economy and committed to the principle of the alienability of land. See id. at
130-33. At the same time, according to Alexander's account, Kent was deeply ambivalent
about the social chum of commercial society and its tendency to tear down social ranks
and traditions and elevate in their place one, sole principle of social order: the pursuit of
material self-interest. See id. As Alexander presents him, Kent was indebted to a conserva-
tive, Federalist brand of republicanism in his traditionalist aspect, but because he em-
braced the market, he was no republican: "His nonrepublican understanding of property is
revealed by his treatment of land as an object of commerce," rather than as the basis of
social and political virtue. Id. at 148.
For Kent, as a student of the Scottish school of political economy and of Adam Smith
in particular, this would not have been a sensible opposition. Alexander proposes that on
Kent's view, "[1]and's function was essentially private: the means to create wealth for indi-
vidual enjoyment," a quality indicated by Kent's willingness to regard land as a commodity.
Id. For Smith, however, the social function of market relations lay precisely in their corn-
modifying nature: By diminishing the prerogative attached to tradition and status and re-
quiring persons to bargain over the terms of their cooperative enterprises, commerce
brought the mighty lower and elevated the poor, closing the cruel gap in sympathy and
self-understanding that feudal and courtly hierarchy produced. See 1 AoM SMITH, THE
THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 120-46 (1792).
In Smith's view, commerce was not a matter of wealth-maximization by atomistic indi-
viduals, but instead a social activity. He explained, "[It is chiefly from this regard to the
sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty." Id. at 120. "Nature,"
according to this account, "taught [man] to feel pleasure in [others'] favourable, and pain
in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering and most
agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most
offensive." Id. at 292. The question to ask of a social order, then, is what economy of
esteem it sets in motion. In a society of inherited hierarchy, "success and preferment de-
pend . . . upon the fanciful and foolish favour of ignorant, presumptuous, and proud
superiors; flattery and falsehood too often prevail over merit and abilities." Id. at 151-52.
In contrast, the success of merchants and craftsmen-dealers in commodities-"almost
always depends upon the favour and good opinion of their neighbours and equals; and
without a tolerably regular conduct these can very seldom be obtained." Id. at 151. Egali-
tarian virtue, then, arose from the need to satisfy others within the reciprocal relations of
bargaining over commodities:
Though one cannot, of course, simply assimilate Kent's thoughts to Smith's, it is most
important to appreciate that the tradition of political economy that Kent relied upon did
not presume that "commodity" and "propriety" were opposed, but rather treated them as
interwoven. I believe this fairly characterizes the aspects of Kent's thought that I am dis-
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Kent, aside from his tie to the case itself and the ample written record
of his views, is to make an a fortiori argument: If a conservative such as
Kent propounded these ideas, then they were indeed pervasive.I7 3
According to Kent, property in England had a double character:
On the one hand, the English freeholder was the archetypal figure
whose common law and constitutional rights formed the model of the
American citizen's liberty.17 4 On the other hand, the prerogatives of
landlords in relation to their tenants, along with the fee tail and other
means of keeping land in powerful families, formed the backbone of a
quasi-feudal system that the United States rejected. 175 American lib-
erty rested partly on a process of stripping away feudal privileges and
constraints on the alienation of property, thus doing away with aristoc-
racy while extending the status of freeholder, at least potentially, to
every citizen-every man a landowner, voter, and juror. 176 Kent was
very far from an egalitarian visionary; indeed, he mocked ideas of the
equal distribution of property as likely ruinous to economic initia-
tive. 177 Nor did he have any sympathy for austere republican visions
cussing here, as well. For a discussion of the Scottish influence on the American founding
generation in general, see Samuel Fleischacker, The Impact on America: Scottish Philosophy
and the American Founding, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTEN-
MENT 316 (Alexander Broadie ed., 2003).
173 Cf WOOD, supra note 84, at 230 ("All Americans believed in the Revolution and its
goals. Conservatives like James Kent had wanted as much as any radical 'to dissolve the
long, intricate and oppressive chain of subordination' of the old monarchical society.").
174 Kent explains the significance of this status in what is, for him, fairly fulsome lan-
guage: "An estate of freehold .... denoted anciently an estate held by a freeman, indepen-
dently of the mere will and caprice of the feudal lord." 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAw *23. He continues, "By the ancient law, a freehold interest conferred upon
the owner a variety of valuable rights and privileges. He became a suitor of the courts, and
the judge in the capacity of ajuror; he was entitled to vote for members of Parliament, and
to defend his title to the land.., and he had a right to call in the aid of the reversioner or
remainderman, when the inheritance was demanded. These rights gave him importance
and dignity as a freeholder." Id. at *24. It bears noting that although Kent's definition of a
freeholder included a tenant for life, it was precisely the doctrine of waste that threatened
to bring such a tenant, in American conditions, back under "the mere will and caprice of
the feudal lord." See id. at *23.
175 As Kent put it, "In England the right of alienation of land was long checked by the
oppressive restraints of the feudal system, and the doctrine of entailments. All those em-
barrassments have been effectually removed in this country." 2 id. at *327. He explained
the political theory of such restraints: "Entailments are recommended in monarchical gov-
ernments as a protection to the power and influence of the landed aristocracy; but such a
policy has no application to republican establishments, where wealth does not form a permanent
distinction, and under which every individual of every family has his equal rights, and is
equally invited, by the genius of the institutions, to depend upon his own merit and exer-
tions." 4 id. at *20 (emphasis added).
176 See 4 id. at *20; 2 id. at *327.
177 See 2 id. at *328-29 ("A state of equality as to property is impossible to be main-
tained, for it is against the laws of our nature; and if it could be reduced to practice, it
would place the human race in a state of tasteless enjoyment and stupid inactivity, which
would degrade the mind and destroy the happiness of social life.").
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of frugal and upright citizens 178 maintaining their equality against the
blandishments of luxury. 17 9 Kent was, instead, a believer in the mar-
ketplace as the arena of free men freely exchanging labor and acquir-
ing land. 180 In contrast to feudal England, he argued, "[e]very
individual has as much freedom in the acquisition, use, and disposi-
tion of his property, as is consistent with good order and the recipro-
cal rights of others." 8" Land made a person substantial, and it was in
the marketplace that each man had an equal chance, in principle, at
increasing and securing his substance. 82 Kent envisioned the formal
equality of the marketplace as supplanting both the tangled hierarchy
of feudal relations and the abject servitude of slavery, which Kent
termed "a great public evil." 183 Kent's view, then, was very far from
the civic, martial, and anticommercial position commonly identified
with republicanism. 184 However, like a vast proportion of the political
class, Kent was antifeudal, antiaristocratic (at least in rejecting aristoc-
racy as a social organizing principle), and committed to free commer-
cial relations and landholding as both cornerstones of, and catalysts
for, the liberty and dignity of citizens.
From Kent's perspective, there would have been distinct advan-
tages to the American standard of waste law, both in its expressive
significance and in its preclusion (at least notionally) of certain exer-
178 Jean-Jacques Rousseau reflected such austere visions in a letter that harshly rejected
the idea that Geneva was better off for having a theater and encouraged the citizens of
Geneva to eschew aristocratic ways for virtuous ones. See 10 JEAN-JAcQUES ROussEAu, Letter
to d Alembert on the Theater (1758), reprinted in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ROussEAu 253,
261-352 (Allan Bloom et al. eds. & trans., Univ. Press of New England 2004).
179 See 2 KENT, supra note 174, at *329-30 ("The notion that plain, coarse, and abstemi-
ous habits of living are requisite to the preservation of heroism and patriotism, has been
derived from the Roman and classical writers. They ... declaimed vehemently against the
degeneracy of their countrymen, which they imputed to the corrupting influence of the
arts of Greece, and of the riches and luxury of the world .... No such fatal union necessa-
rily exists between prosperity and tyranny, or between wealth and national corruption.").
Kent cited as evidence the survival of English liberty amidst commerce and the arts, and of
French patriotism despite "the effeminate luxury of her higher classes and of her capital."
Id. at *330.
180 See id. at *329 ("When the laws allow a free circulation to property... the opera-
tion of the steady laws of nature will, of themselves, preserve a proper equilibrium, and
dissipate the mounds of property as fast as they accumulate.").
181 Id. at *328.
182 In this respect, Kent's thoughts parallel Eric Foner's description of the integral role
played by "free labor" in the ideology of the early Republican party. See FONER, supra note
85, at 11-39.
183 See 2 KENT, supra note 174, at *256. Kent's characterization of slaves' status reveals
something of the intensity of his conviction that property and economic relations formed
much of a person's substance: "[Slaves] cannot take property by descent or purchase, and
all they find, and all they hold, belongs to the master. They cannot make lawful contracts,
and they are deprived of civil rights .... Their condition is more analogous to that of the
slaves of the ancients, than to that of the villeins of feudal times." Id. at *253. These
conditions were among those making slaves "property, rather than persons." Id. at *253.
184 See McCoy, supra note 85, at 48-104.
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cises of prerogative. 8 5 The English doctrine was a law of prerogative,
structured by its commitment to the protection of the superior estate.
It enforced the presumptive veto of the reversioner against any initia-
tive of the tenant, unless the reversioner explicitly surrendered her
prerogative. 186 In short, it made the tenant directly answerable in his
major economic and agricultural decisions to a social superior whose
status was marked by the superior character of her estate in land.187
In contrast, the American doctrine put the two estates on equal
footing in a critical sense: The reversioner no longer exercised ongo-
ing authority over the use of the land and could not invoke waste doc-
trine in its status-confirming normative aspect. Instead, his right was
to receive at the end of the tenancy a property commensurate in value
to the one surrendered to the tenant. That said, the property might
have been timbered, rearranged in its patterns of cropping, or
equipped with new fences and buildings. In principle, the tenant was
185 See supra Part I.D.
186 See supra Part I.A.
187 Amartya Sen distinguishes between two types of values that he regards market rela-
tions as promoting, each one a dimension of freedom. See SEN, Markets, supra note 154, at
506. The first, the "process aspect of freedom," concerns noninterference from others in
making, and acting on, one's choices. See id. The second, the "opportunity aspect of free-
dom," concerns the substance of the choices on which one is in fact able to act, that is, the
actual scope of one's capacities. See id. On the account I have been giving, the American
standard of waste can be regarded as promoting both types of freedom. It promotes the
first by authorizing tenants to take decisions in the use of the land they occupy without
interference from reversioners. It promotes the second both directly, by enabling the ten-
ant to act on such decisions with the resources of the estate, and indirectly, by contributing
to societal wealth.
I would add that a third dimension of freedom is arguably present here, one with
which Adam Smith (a muse for both Kent and Sen) was much concerned. See, e.g., 1
SMITH, supra note 172. One might call it "liberal virtue," or, less contentiously, "charactero-
logical capacity for freedom." I do not mean (although I do not intend to detract from)
the familiar "republican virtue" ascribed to landholders because of their alleged stability
and investment in the social order. See THOMAS JEFFVERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia,
in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123, 290-91 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) ("Those who
labour in the earth are the chosen people of God ...whose breasts he had made his
peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue .... Corruption of morals in the mass
of cultivators is a phaenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example....
[T]he proportion which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears in any state to
that of its husbandmen, is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a good-
enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption."); Kenneth R. Minogue,
The Concept of Property and Its Contemporary Significance, in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY, supra note
70, at 3, 7-9, 21 (remarking on the persistence of this "constitutional" value in property).
Instead, I mean the predisposition, one might even say the psychic capacity, to assert
one's own interests and convictions as legitimate considerations for others' reasoning and
as legitimate motives for oneself. See 1 SMITH, supra note 172, at 71. The presence or
absence of this quality can run so deep as to determine whether individuals can identify
their own interests at all. Sen has pointed out that the poor, and particularly poor women,
are much less likely to report ill health when asked than those somewhat more privileged.
See SEN, Social Choice, supra note 72, at 90-92. Part of the purpose of bolstering the legal
claims of tenants relative to reversioners is to produce an American citizen who will regard
her own claims as legitimate and assert them even against a perceived social superior.
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sovereign over the land for as long as he held it, with his liberty
bounded by the requirement that he pass on, in John Locke's preg-
nant words, enough and as good at the end of his occupation.18 8 This
revision in waste doctrine brought two essential changes: First, be-
cause the American standard was guided by the market value of the
land, and thus treated land as a commodity, it deprived land of one
aspect of its status as a marker of social hierarchy, elevating some and
binding others through interwoven and hierarchical claims on the
same plot. t8 9 This did not, however, eliminate the relation of land
and status altogether. Rather, the standard served to place land
within a new logic of status: a formally egalitarian vision of market
relations, in which each individual had, as Kent observed, an equal
right and opportunity to acquire, use, and dispose of property. 190 As
an educative, quasi-transformative default, then, the American stan-
dard of waste did not just abstain from the question of status, but
hinted at a new form of status-one that was commercial and formally
egalitarian.
Two structural aspects of the American standard are particularly
striking in this regard. First is the symbolic matter of the standard's
expression: Through the standard of husbandry, the tenant is
modeled as an owner in fee and held to a commensurate standard.
On the one hand, this is simply an expression of the economically
rational expectation that the owner in fee will use his land prudently,
and that making that ideal behavior authoritative for the tenant will
capture the principle of avoiding permanent injury to the land. On
the other hand, in a fashion suggestive of the egalitarian implications
of marketizing relations in land, this expression of the American stan-
dard eliminates hierarchy from both the language and the imagery of
waste law; the tenant is envisioned as an owner in fee, and his behavior
is appropriate inasmuch as he lives up to that standard. This is quite a
different matter from the imagery of the English default-a tenant
who collects wood for maintenance under quasi-feudal rights, persists
in inherited patterns of cropping, and seeks the permission of the so-
cially superior reversioner for any undertaking outside these bounds.
188 See, e.g., LocKE, supra note 4, at 309.
189 This is Gordon Wood's account of the significance of Kent's argument for a prop-
erty qualification for state senatorial election: It makes property a mere "interest," to which
everyone in principle had equal access, rather than a permanent marker of distinction. See
WooD, supra note 84, at 269-70. I think, however, that Wood exaggerates the extent to
which this was an unintended consequence of a rear-guard effort to preserve hierarchy.
Indeed, Kent's own language suggests that he regarded equal access to the acquisition of
property as the right sort of egalitarian principle for republican America. See 2 KENT, supra
note 174, at *329.
190 See id.
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The second aspect of republicanism in the American standard is
more concrete, but its imaginative significance is equally poignant.
The decision as to the propriety of land use under the English rule
belonged predominantly to the reversioner. The initial formulation
of the American standard placed determination of what constituted a
permanent injury to the land in the hands ofjurors, that is, citizens. 19'
Under the English rule, the decision reflected a prerogative evocative
of feudal authority. Command ran up the ladder of obligation, culmi-
nating in the crown: the seat of power and theoretical owner of all
land. 192 The American standard reflected, by contrast, a horizontal
and republican image of political authority, in which all citizens
equally possessed the power of consent that founded the legitimacy of
government. By indicating the will (and custom) of the citizenry, a
jury trial confirmed the political community's status as the source of
authority, and checked the reversioner's prerogative with the judg-
ment of that political community.1 93
191 See supra Part I.D.2.
192 This characterization may seem somewhat at odds with the earlier contention that
the English rule probably played a large role as a bargain-inducing default. In the formula-
tion presented here, I am less concerned with the actual operation of the English rule than
with the American perception of that rule, which the great contrast of the republican imagi-
nation, the feudal Old World versus the republican New World, helped to power. The
question is not what the English rule did for the English, or even what it might have meant
expressively to the English, so much as what it meant to Americans, whose self-understand-
ing was partly founded on a (partly imagined) contrast with England.
To understand the difference between the American conception of English law and
the actual workings of property law in England, it is helpful to consider Lawrence Fried-
man's contention that much of the difference lay in the openness and rapid turnover of
the American land market, and the relative lack of sophistication of American lawyers and
conveyancers. See FRIDarA, supra note 84, at 206-07. In England, sophisticated legal de-
vices enabled the gentry to circumvent such restrictions on alienation as the fee tail. In the
United States, however, such devices were ill-understood, and the flurry of transactions that
accompanied the westward movement of the population would have overwhelmed the le-
gal system had each one required elaborate consultation and drafting. See id. at 210. Thus,
a formalism that remained tolerable to the parties it affected in England would have se-
verely inhibited American practice. See id. The difference, however, was not that English
property use was static and property relations feudal. Rather, it was that England was rich,
sophisticated, and hierarchical, with limited social mobility, thus allowing a relatively small
landholding population to operate with the help of a refined bar. See id. at 207. A popula-
tion with considerable mobility and vast new tracts of land constantly entering the market,
however, could not negotiate arcane legal forms. See id. at 206-07. Although Friedman
does not mention it, I would suggest that this pragmatic consideration became appended
to republican ideology and to the caricature of "feudal" England in part because the feudal
aspects of English property law represented everything that would have kept most Ameri-
cans out of that land market: settled wealth, existing claims on land, and legal sophistica-
tion. Republican thought, along with its other attractions, provided a vocabulary of status
that treated English wealth and refinement as evidence of corruption, and rough-and-
ready American initiative as the mark of virtue.
193 This point helps to explain a seeming paradox in the "republican" account of waste
doctrine. It may seem odd to advance an ideology committed to clarifying and consolidat-
ing the rights of the landholder (in the interest of both independence and alienability) by
strengthening the rights of the tenant, which strictly speaking pushed in exactly the oppo-
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D. The Pluralist Addition II: Progress and Land Use
It was a great theme of seventeenth and eighteenth-century po-
lemics and juristic speculation on the European colonization of
America that the right to property originated in, and depended on,
making productive use of it. 194 Those who.failed to do so created no
exclusive claim that they might assert against new arrivals who pro-
posed to settle, clear, and cultivate the land. John Donne preached,
"[A]I1 Mankinde must take care, that places be emprov'd, as farre as
may be, to the best advantage of Mankinde in generall." 195 Rebutting
Roger Williams's defense of Native American interests in their land,
John Cotton declared, "We did not conceive that it is ajust Tide to so
vast a Continent, to make no other improvement of millions of Acres
in it, but onely to burne it up for pastime."'196 This position developed
from Locke's famous theory of original acquisition, 19 7 which Emmer-
ich de Vattel later fashioned into a more specific defense of American
colonization. 9 8
site direction. The key here is that the concern of republican thought was not chiefly with
the class of landowners, but rather with the class of smallholders who made productive use of
their land and thereby achieved personal independence. Renfiers with manorial estates
did not meet the republican image of a smallholder; on the contrary, the entrepreneurial
tenant whose initiative was punished with a waste action looked like the archetypal subordi-
nated feudal underling. Thus, it might have been quite significant that the American
waste law was early articulated inJackson v. Brownson, 7Johns. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). For
a similarly "paradoxical" development, see Friedman's account of the concurrent rise of
mechanics' liens, which enabled an artisan to put a lien on the property of a client who
failed to pay him, and homestead exemptions, which protected homesteads from creditors.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 84, at 213-15. While the latter consolidated the integrity of the small
landholder's claims, the former introduced new and conflicting claims on the same piece
of land; however, artisans were also a class of smallholders. See id. at 215; see also
Sprankling, supra note 39, at 537-47 (discussing doctrines favoring entrepreneurial set-
tlers' land claims over those of idle speculators with prior formal title).
194 For a discussion of the pervasive effect of this idea in the development of United
States common law in nineteenth-century, see Sprankling, supra note 39. John G.
Sprankling surveys several areas of property law, including waste, nuisance, and adverse
possession, and argues that judges revised each to encourage the clearing of wilderness by
initiative-taking settlers. While I find Sprankling's historical discussion admirable and
helpful, I am skeptical of his view that these common law doctrines continue to constitute a
significant impediment to conservation.
195 4JOHN DONNE, THE SERMONS OFJOHN DONNE 274 (George R. Potter & Evelyn M.
Simpson eds., 1959) (emphasis removed).
196 John Cotton, A Reply to Mr. Williams (1647), in 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER
WILLIAMS 9, 47 (1963).
197 See LocKE, supra note 4, at 303-20. For a discussion of the use of Locke in this
polemical tradition, see JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. LOCKE IN
CONTEXTS 166-67 (1993).
198 Kent gives an account of Vattel's view in 3 KEINr, supra note 174, at *387 (writing
that Vattel "observed that the cultivation of the soil was an obligation imposed by nature
upon mankind, and that the human race could not well subsist, or greatly multiply, if rude
tribes, which had not advanced from the hunter state, were entitled to claim and retain all
the boundless regions through which they might wander"); see also RIcHARD TUCK, THE
IGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 191-96 (1999) (explaining Vattel's ideas in relation to Locke's).
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As Chancellor Kent would later characterize those doctrines,
our colonial ancestors .... seem to have deemed it to be unreasona-
ble, and a perversion of the duties and design of the human race, to
bar the Europeans, with their implements of husbandry and the
arts, with their laws, their learning, their liberty, and their religion,
from all entrance into this mighty continent, lest they might trespass
upon some part of the interminable forests, deserts, and hunting-
grounds of an uncivilized, erratic, and savage race of men.199
The specific "destiny and duty of the human race" as conceived by the
first American settlers was, Kent explained, "to subdue the earth, and
till the ground."200
Most state courts adopting Jackson's rationale gave an account of
the change from the English rule to the American standard that com-
ported with these themes. These courts observed that America was
substantially uncleared and populated by a westward-moving and eco-
nomically dynamic population, which had to rework the landscape to
establish itself. Despite finding waste in the defendant's clearing of
timber, the Jackson majority insisted, "The lessee undoubtedly had a
right to fell part of the timber, so as to fit the land for cultivation. '" 2 1
The dissenters did the majority one better, conceding, "The doctrine
of waste, as understood in England, is inapplicable to a new, unsettled
country."20 2 Even before Jackson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted that "[1]ands in general with us are enhanced by being
cleared," adding that it would be "an outrage on common sense" to
call such enhancement waste. 20 3 North Carolina's highest court
added, "It would have been absurd to hold that the clearing of the
forest, so as to fit it for the habitation and use of man was waste." 20 4
America was "a new and opening land, covered largely with primeval
growth .... [H] ere, the clearing of the forest growth, and fitting the
virgin soil which it covers for cultivation, is ordinarily an improvement
most valuable to the property."20 5
Complementing courts' insistence on the distinctiveness of Amer-
ican conditions was explicit anxiety about the implications of main-
taining the English waste doctrine. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court found that the old rule must be discarded because
"[t] he ancient doctrine of waste, if universally adopted in this country,
would greatly impede the progress of improvement, without any com-
pensating benefit. To be beneficial, therefore, the rules of law must
199 3 KENT, supra note 174, at *386.
200 Id. at *386-87 (emphasis removed).
201 Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
202 Id. at 237 (emphasis removed).
203 Hastings v. Crunckleton, 3 Yeates 261, 262 (Pa. 1801).
204 Shine v. Wilcox, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 631, 632 (1837)
205 King v. Miller, 6 S.E. 660, 666 (N.C. 1888).
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be accommodated to the situation of the country." 20 6 In New York,
the chancery court concluded that "to apply the ancient doctrines of
waste to modern tenancies, even for short terms, would in some of our
cities and villages, put an entire stop to the progress of improve-
ment."20 7 Progress and improvement were the courts' aims, and west-
ward movement across the continent was synonymous with
betterment. The contrasting, and anxiety-producing, image was of ar-
rested movement, stasis, land locked into forest, and the development
of the continent brought to a halt.
Why anxiety? I have already argued that there is little reason,
either in economic reasoning or in historical evidence, to believe that
the English rule of waste risked reducing any part of the country to
stasis. 208 Two alternative reasons for the anxiety suggest themselves:
First, the doctrine of the natural right and duty to cultivate the land
was a doctrine of expropriation and conquest, with roots in the theory
of just war as much as in the theory of property, and commentators
offered it for centuries as a defense of European claims to America.20 9
By the nineteenth century, jurists such as Chancellor Kent and Chief
Justice John Marshall declined to rely on, and were apt to disparage,
such natural law claims. 210 At the same time, however, their defense
206 Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 304, 312 (1846).
207 Winship v. Pitts, 3 Paige Ch. 259, 262 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
208 See supra Part II.A..
209 As Richard Tuck explains, the conception of property that became foundational to
European claims on North America originated in Hugo Grotius's argument for Dutch ac-
cess to the maritime trade routes of the East Indies, then controlled by the Iberian powers.
See TUCK, supra note 198, at 89-90. Grotius founded his case for freedom of the seas on an
account of property, arguing that one could have property only in those things that one
could personally consume or transform. See id. at 90. He further-and crucially-con-
tended that a political community could assert jurisdiction over, and exclude others from,
only those portions of the globe that had first been rendered private property. See id. at
90-91. The sea, which famously rolls on forever, was thus ineligible to become property
or, consequently, the object of exclusive political jurisdiction. See id. Portuguese defense
of the sea routes could therefore not constitute just war.
It was an unintended consequence of Grotius's theory, according to Tuck, that nonag-
ricultural and nomadic peoples, whom Europeans saw as passing over the land like traders
and fisherfolk over the sea, without transforming it by labor or occupation, could have no
property and thus no political jurisdiction over it. See id. at 104. Grotius's account shaped
Locke's view that property, acquired by mixing one's labor with the natural world, is both
chronologically and normatively prior to government, which property-holders institute to
remedy the inconveniences of living without civil law. See id. at 172-77. From that view
followed the conclusion that whatever form of community Native Americans had, it could
not represent a form of sovereignty. See TULLY, supra note 197, at 149-51.
One should note that Blackstone took a different view of Locke's thought, contending
that Native Americans enjoyed a claim to their land premised not on sovereignty, but on
self-preservation, which entitled them to hold the land in a manner compatible with their
distinctive use of it. For a discussion of this issue in the interpretation of Locke, see id. at
169-76.
210 In Johnson v. M'Intosh, both parties cited Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, and the
defendants, arguing that Native Americans were legally incompetent to transfer land, also
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of the European claim was the fact of historical development: Europe-
ans had settled the continent and made it their own, in a way that was
ultimately incompatible with continued occupation and claims to
ownership by Native Americans.2 11 That settlement, they recognized,
had proceeded on natural law claims, and to base legitimacy on the
settlement was to accept, even uneasily, the principles on which it had
proceeded.21 2 The productive use of land, therefore, had a special
historical claim on Americans; whether or not it was everywhere and
at all times the destiny of mankind, it was the destiny Americans had
staked out for themselves. To indulge or encourage stasis, even sym-
bolically or in a handful of exemplary cases, might have signified to
some minds a break with American purpose. Much like republican
values, values of progress and dynamism in land use might have
shaped the American standard of waste as a normative doctrine con-
cerned almost entirely with symbolic endorsement of an attitude to-
ward the natural world to which the country's public and legal culture
was committed.
Any tarrying with stasis might also have suggested an erosion of
the republican spirit of liberty, at least in the moderate and commer-
cial aspect that Kent gave it. He argued that a decent measure of
equality in commercial societies came from the constant vicissitudes of
the market:
invoked Locke, Vattel, and the Baron de Montesquieu. See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 563,
567-71 (1823). The defendants argued, "Not only has the practice of all civilized nations
been in conformity with [the natural-law doctrine that Native Americans enjoyed neither
property nor sovereignty], but the whole theory of their titles to lands in America, rests
upon the hypothesis, that the Indians had no right of soil as sovereign, independent
states." Id. at 567. Chief Justice Marshall, however, declined to consider this tradition in
his ruling, adverting instead to the practice of nations and of the United States in particu-
lar. See id. at 572-77. Chancellor Kent, after a review of the role of natural law doctrines in
justifying European expropriation of America, contended that the colonists had not in fact
relied upon, and that contemporary jurists could likewise not invoke, "whatever loose opin-
ions might have been entertained, or latitudinary doctrines inculcated, in favor of the ab-
stract right to possess and colonize America." 3 KN-r, supra note 174, at *388-89.
211 As Chief Justice Marshall put it, "[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a
wilderness." Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590. Kent, also, accepted that the incompatibil-
ity of European and Native American ways of life made their clash, and the Europeans'
triumph, inevitable: "The settlement of ... the United States has been attended with as
little violence and aggression, on the part of the whites ... as were compatible with the fact
of the entry of a race of civilized men into the territory of savages, and with the power and
the determination to reclaim and occupy it." 3 KEr, supra note 174, at *390-91. Particu-
larly significant is Kent's use of the word "reclaim," suggesting a redemption of the land
into its proper condition.
212 Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "However extravagant the pretension of converting
the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and
held under it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it be-
comes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned." Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.
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When the laws allow a free circulation to property by the abolition
of perpetuities, entailments, the claims of primogeniture, and all
inequalities of descent, the operation of the steady laws of nature
will, of themselves, preserve a proper equilibrium, and dissipate the
mounds of property as fast as they accumulate.2 13
Social equality, in the sense of equal-in-principle opportunity, de-
pended in part on the dynamic operation of markets, which in turn
depended on treating land as a commodity so that it would move to its
highest-value use and user. In this respect, economic dynamism and
modest republican egalitarianism seemed mutually reinforcing princi-
ples. Thus, the same considerations that encouraged a normative de-
fault against hierarchical land relations also encouraged a normative
default against any legal enshrinement of stasis in land use.2 14
E. Summary of the Interpretive Argument
My argument is that the appeal of the American standard lay no
more in its character as a problem-solving or equilibrium-inducing de-
fault than in its significance as a normative and transformative default.
This argument involves several additions, or elaborations, to Alan
Schwartz's concept of the normative default.2 15 My argument implies
that the concern of normative defaults may be broader than the issues
of distributive fairness that Schwartz suggests,2 1 6 including questions
of basic political values and the social structures corresponding to
those values. Who has political and legal authority? From what
sources are those forms of authority derived? Relatedly, what are the
social bases of dignity and self-respect, and how do the political and
legal systems allocate them? These, too, are questions with which nor-
mative defaults may sometimes be concerned, particularly in transi-
tional circumstances, in which property and contracting rules are in
213 2 KENT, supra note 174, at *329.
214 I believe this account is in many respects complementary to that of Horwitz. Hor-
witz's view, briefly summarized, is that the early nineteenth century was characterized by
the judicial uprooting of previously well-established rights in smallholders-for instance,
the right to veto certain uses of land by tenants-in favor of a systematic promotion of
economic dynamism in furtherance of capitalist industrial development. See HORWITZ,
supra note 38, at 31-62. The introduction of a default standard trumping the reversioner's
veto with a criterion of economic value certainly fits that account. The view of the market
as promoting an "anti-feudal" and socially meaningful kind of formal equality that I have
drawn from the conservative Kent is another description of the process Horwitz portrays.
The advent of commercial relations at once emancipates persons from traditional hierar-
chy and prerogative and violently disrupts settled expectations and forms of sustenance, so
that they may be meaningfully said to be both better off and worse off, depending on the
individual and the axis of evaluation. SeeJEDEDIAH PuRDV, BEING AMERICA: LIBERTY, COM-
MERCE, AND VIOLENCE IN AN AMERICAN WORLD 145-47, 206 (2003).
215 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
216 See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 391-93 (discussing distributive fairness quite appro-
priately in the context of bargains between sophisticated contractors and other partici-
pants in a fully developed commercial society).
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flux and the political and social relations to which they correspond
are contested. In such circumstances, it is beyond dispute that
mandatory rules-such as the abolition of the one-quarter tax on
Hudson Valley tenants' transfer of fee rentals, 217 or the presence or
absence of property requirements for voting218-have intense norma-
tive significance along the lines I have been describing.
For purposes of illuminating American waste doctrine, my argu-
ment is that default rules also may partake of that significance in sev-
eral ways. First, as an expressive matter, default rules may appeal to
judges and other decision-makers for their symbolic consonance with
broad normative principles-especially when the symbolic associa-
tions of two doctrinal choices present a stark choice, such as the
choice between quasi-feudal and broadly republican outlooks. 219 Sec-
ond, a normative default may be selected for its significance in an
action in which bargaining has already taken place, but the terms of
the bargain have yet to be interpreted, as in Jackson v. Brownson-par-
ticularly when, as seems likely to have been the case there, the facts
crystallize an ongoing legal and political dispute. Third, the doctrine
may be what we might call norm-forcing. By changing the default, the
American standard required landlords who wanted to retain English-
style prerogative to propose that term in bargaining, in a time when
conventional attitudes increasingly disfavored it.220 While not disposi-
tive, requiring a landlord to make a distasteful proposition explicit
might lead her to abandon the proposition altogether, or embolden
the tenant to refuse it. It is a familiar point of political theory that the
power to determine which principles are implicit in the background
217 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
219 For a classic discussion of the significance of the perception that the rules of a
property regime comport with basic, shared ideas of fairness, see Frank I. Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1218-24 (1967). Although Michelman does not use the rubric of
"expressive" law, typically defined as a legal action's indication of society's commitment to
a value or attitude, that is what he has in mind. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson &
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503,
1506-08, 1531-33 (2000). For a discussion of the commitment of the legal reformers of
the time to eliminating feudal remnants, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 84, at 209-10 (noting
that reformers "eliminated... doctrines and institutions.. . which, whatever their impact,
appeared to be 'tyrannical' or 'feudal' .... Against the 'tyrannical' and 'feudal,' legislators
slashed away with might and main").
220 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Com-
mons, 30 ENVTrL. L. 241, 256-57 (2000) (explaining that people tend to regard the surren-
der of a privilege they now enjoy as the loss of right, which they will resist, while they are
much less likely to expend the same energy or take the same risks to acquire the same
privilege if their baseline position lacks it); see also ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRU-
DENCE 186 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Liberty Classics 1982) (1762-66) (discussing the reluc-
tance of the socially powerful "to condescend to bargain and treat with those whom they
look upon as their inferiors").
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of debate, and which come to the fore as explicit questions, is an im-
portant form of power over others. 221 The same may sometimes be
true in the context of private bargaining.
Those interested in the relationship between property and such
basic political themes as power and freedom may be particularly
struck by the attention in the law of waste to relations of power among
private persons. When American lawyers talk about property's rela-
tion to political themes, we are in the habit of imagining the individ-
ual on the one hand and the polity on the other. Takings law serves as
a paradigm for this idea. To the libertarian, property secures the indi-
vidual against the majority. 2 22 The flip side of that attitude is the radi-
cal democrat, who sees American law's emphasis on private property
as a fetish that inhibits egalitarian and experimental political deci-
sions. 223 But here, exemplified in a thinker as conservative as Kent,
we find the idea that a major role of property law is to structure the
relations of private persons, setting the terms by which they may enlist
each other in their projects. 2 24 From this perspective, property re-
gimes set the starting point for any joint project that is not founded
on either altruism or coercion. The nexus of waste doctrine with re-
publicanism is a reminder that American property law is indebted to a
tradition of political economy that regards liberal property regimes as
valuable because they can increase the autonomy and dignity people
experience in their dealings with one another. When property re-
gimes fail to achieve this, the failure is not something to be discovered
from outside but should be judged by a standard internal to the legacy
of property itself.
CONCLUSION
Study of the American transformation of waste law reveals three
classes of values shaping the doctrine. One is the social interest in the
economically efficient use of resources. The other two are less widely
recognized; much of the analysis in this Article has aimed at confirm-
ing their existence and illustrating their character. One comprises
the organizing values of political society-in the instance of waste doc-
trine, rejection of hierarchical social relations founded on unequal
claims to land and the embrace of a market in property, which makes
221 For a recent discussion of the effects of choice-framing institutions as a form of
power, see David Singh Grewal, Network Power and Globalization, 17 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 89
(2003). For a canonical statement of this approach in recent political theory, see STEVEN
LuKEs, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974).
222 See, e.g., J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional
Thought, 45 B.C. L. Rv. 499, 530-32 (2004).
223 See, e.g., HORWIrz, supra note 38, at 31-62; Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in
Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 939 (1985).
224 See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
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land a vehicle for opportunity and mobility rather than a marker of
enduring social distinctions. The other is the idea of an appropriate
relationship to the natural world-in the case of nineteenth-century
waste doctrine, one of productivity and improvement, but in other
settings perhaps founded on an ethics of conservation or
stewardship. 225
What is the relation of default property rules to such interests? I
have argued that, at least in the case of waste law, normative defaults
promote these values in several ways. First, normative defaults have
expressive value, affirming adherence to guiding values even when
they have little or no practical significance. 226 Second, even a few
changed results may have great exemplary power; a Hudson Valley
landlord's authority to turn out or fine a tenant for improving an es-
tate without permission is a potent symbol of social relations in gen-
eral. Third, a default rule can retroactively interpret existing
contracts, as in Jackson, without ever shaping a prospective bargain.
Finally, default rules may be norm-forcing because they make an issue
explicit, which may help to displace once-assumed assignments of
rights that have become contestable.
American waste doctrine embodies the competing values that in-
form the American relationship to property. The commitment to eco-
nomic dynamism still informs the law of property.227 So does the
independence-securing function of ownership, even if the formula-
tion today has more to do with a libertarian ideal of individual auton-
omy, and less with the preconditions of political judgment and the
225 In characterizing such values, it strikes me as helpful to have recourse to Charles
Taylor's concept of "irreducibly social goods," values whose intelligibility and achievability
depend on being part of a cultural life in which they are recognized by some, if not all,
relevant others, and in which concrete social practices do not thwart their realization in
lived life. See CHARLES TAYLOR, Irreducibly Social Goods, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 127,
138-40 (1995). I have added to Taylor's definition the idea that for a good to be achieva-
ble, it must be the case that prevalent social practices do not systematically thwart the
good's realization-for instance, social practices today would thwart attempts to live the
social life of an Elizabethan courtier or a Knight Templar. Taylor's argument strikes me as
more concerned with the conditions for intelligibility than with those for achievability.
226 See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 219, at 150-08, 1531-33; Michelman, supra
note 219, at 1218-24.
227 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 30, at 32-34. I do not, of course, intend to identify
reasoning based on economics with a normative commitment to economic dynamism ex-
clusive of other considerations. For a helpful discussion of the place of economic reason-
ing in thinking about the management of natural resources, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
What Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 175 (2003). Thompson emphasizes that
while a maximizing calculus may not in practice provide a satisfactory, comprehensive
schedule of social welfare, the analytic tools of economics are invaluable in the following
contexts: designing efficient means to ends, however selected, see id. at 179-86; under-
standing the perennial threats to effective policy, such as externalities, commons tragedies,
and collective-action problems, see id. at 186-90; and presenting one's own commitments
in a language generally available to other citizens in the public sphere, see id. at 194-95.
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dignity of citizens, than was once the case.2 28 So also do ideas about
the appropriate human relationship to the natural world, which now
partake more of a conservationist spirit than of a belief in the duty to
bring nature under the axe and the plough. 229 These strands of con-
temporary self-conception, for both political communities and indi-
viduals, are sometimes competing and sometimes complementary.
Taken together, they present a serious challenge to any effort to pre-
sent a unitary and harmonious account of the values that shape prop-
erty regimes. 230
228 For such libertarian accounts of the independence-securing function of ownership,
see, for example, RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN (1985); MILTON & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
(1980); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999).
229 For conservationist perspectives on the appropriate relationship of humans to the
natural world, see, for example, WENDELL BERRY, THE UNSETrLING OF AMERICA: CULTURE &
AGRICULTURE (1977); ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND
THERE (1949); GARY SNYDER, THE PRACTICE OF THE WILD (1990).
230 See ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY 122-25 (1987) (concluding a survey of theories of the
relationship between property and freedom with a warning against any effort to produce a
unified theory of these themes).
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